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 1  This text draws on, extends, and updates earlier publications by the authors includ-
ing: Goldemberg et al.,  1988 ; Nakicenovic et al.,  1996b ;  1998 ; Rogner and Popescu, 
 2000 ; Grubler,  2004 ; and WEA (World Energy Assessment),  2004 . 
 1.1  Introduction and Roadmap 
 Life is but a continuous process of energy conversion and transformation. 
The accomplishments of civilization have largely been achieved through 
the increasingly efficient and extensive harnessing of various forms of 
energy to extend human capabilities and ingenuity. Energy is similarly 
indispensable for continued human development and economic growth. 
Providing adequate, affordable energy is a necessary (even if by itself 
insufficient) prerequisite for eradicating poverty, improving human wel-
fare, and raising living standards worldwide. Without economic growth, it 
will also be difficult to address social and environmental challenges, espe-
cially those associated with poverty. Without continued institutional, social, 
and technological innovation, it will be impossible to address planetary 
challenges such as climate change. Energy extraction, conversion, and use 
always generate undesirable by-products and emissions – at a minimum 
in the form of dissipated heat. Energy cannot be created or destroyed – it 
can only be converted from one form to another, along a one-way street 
from higher to lower grades (qualities) of energy. Although it is common 
to discuss energy “consumption,” energy is actually transformed rather 
than consumed. 
 This Energy Primer 1 aims at a basic-level introduction to fundamental 
concepts and data that help to understand  energy systems holistically 
and to provide a common conceptual and terminological framework 
before examining in greater detail the various aspects of energy sys-
tems from challenges and options to  integrated solutions, as done in 
the different chapters of the Global Energy Assessment (GEA). Different 
chapters will quite naturally emphasize different aspects and compo-
nents of the global energy system, but they all share this basic common 
understanding of the importance of  integrating all aspects related to 
energy into a common systems framework. Given the focus on assessing 
 current energy systems as well as possible transformation pathways into 
 future energy systems throughout this publication, the Energy Primer 
also aims at providing historical context that helps to understand how 
current energy systems have emerged and what characteristic rates of 
change are in these large-scale systems. 
 After an introduction and roadmap to  Chapter 1 ( Section 1.1 ),  Section 1.2 
introduces the fundamental concepts and terms used to describe global 
energy systems ( Section 1.2.1 ) and then proceeds with an overview of 
the fundamental driver: the demand for  energy services ( Section 1.2.2 ), 
which is key in this assessment.  Section 1.2.3 then summarizes the major 
links between energy services and primary energy resources at the glo-
bal level for the year 2005. The section also contains a summary of major 
energy units and scales (with technical details given in  Appendix 1.A ). 
 Section 1.3 then turns to a historical perspective on energy transitions, 
covering both energy end-use demand and services ( Section 1.3.1 ), as 
well as energy supply ( Section 1.3.2 ), and concludes with a brief intro-
duction into the relationship between energy and economic growth 
( Section 1.3.3 ). A long historical perspective is important in understand-
ing both the fundamental drivers of energy system transitions, as well 
as the constraints imposed by the typically slow rates of change in this 
large, capital-intensive system characterized by long-lived infrastruc-
tures (Grubler et al.,  1999 ). 
 Section 1.4 then discusses the central aspect of energy efficiency, 
summarizing key concepts and measures of energy efficiency 
( Section 1.4.1 ), and estimates of global energy efficiencies based on the 
first ( Section 1.4.2 ) and second law of thermodynamics ( Section 1.4.3 ), 
as well as energy intensities ( Section 1.4.4 ). 
 Section 1.5 provides a summary of key concepts ( Section 1.5.1 ) and 
numbers of global  energy resources that provide both key inputs 
and key limitations for energy systems. Fossil, fissile ( Section 1.5.2 ), 
and renewable resources ( Section 1.5.3 ) are covered comprehensively 
along with a basic introduction to energy densities, which are particu-
larly critical for renewable energy ( Section 1.5.4 ). 
 Section 1.6 provides a summary of major energy flows associated with 
production, use, and trade of energy ( Section 1.6.2 ) and energy conver-
sions ( Section 1.6.3 ) that link energy resources to final energy demands. 
After an introduction and overview ( Section 1.6.1 ), production, use, and 
trade of both direct ( Section 1.6.2.1 ) and indirect “embodied” energy, 
( Section 1.6.2.2 ) are discussed, and all energy trade flows summarized 
in  Section 1.6.2.3. The discussion of energy conversions is short, as it is 
dealt with in detail in the various chapters of this publication. After an 
introductory overview ( Section 1.6.3.1 ), the electricity sector is briefly 
highlighted ( Section 1.6.3.2 ). 
 Section 1.7 summarizes the main impacts of global energy systems on 
the environment in terms of emissions, including greenhouse gases 
( Section 1.7.2 ) and other pollutants where the energy sector plays an 
important role ( Section 1.7.3 ). Emissions are central environmental 
externalities associated with all energy conversions. 
 Section 1.8 then complements the global synthesis of  Chapter 1 by 
highlighting the vast heterogeneities in levels, patterns, and struc-
ture of energy use, by first introducing basic concepts and measures 
( Section 1.8.1 ), before addressing the heterogeneity across nations 
( Section 1.8.2 ), within nations ( Section 1.8.3 ), as well as energy dispar-
ities ( Section 1.8.4 ). This short section is of critical importance, especially 
in terms of a global assessment, as the inevitable top-down perspective 
involving Gigatonnes and Terawatts often glosses over differences in 
time, social strata, incomes, lifestyles, and human aspirations. 
 Section 1.9 provides a primer on basic economic concepts related to 
energy end-use and energy supply, using cooking in developing coun-
tries and electricity generation options as illustrative examples. 
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 Lastly,  Section 1.10 leads into the full GEA, by providing an overview 
roadmap to the structure of GEA and its chapters. 
 Appendix 1.A returns to the rather technical, but nonetheless funda-
mental, aspect of units, scales, and energy accounting intricacies. This 
document uses uniformly the International System (SI) of (metric) units 
and has also adapted a uniform accounting standard for primary energy 
to achieve consistency and comparability across the different chapters. 
This is especially important in the energy field, that to date continues to 
use a plethora of vernacular units and accounting methods. 
 Appendix 1.B provides convenient summary tables of conversion and 
emission factors, and summarizes the various levels of regional aggre-
gations used throughout GEA. 
 1.2  The Global Energy System 
 1.2.1   Description of the Global Energy System 
 The  energy system comprises all components related to the production, 
conversion, and use of energy. 
 Key components of the energy system comprise: primary  energy 
resources which are harnessed and converted to  energy carriers 2 (such 
as electricity or fuels such as gasoline), which are used in end-use appli-
cations for the provision of  energy forms (heat, kinetic energy, light, 
etc.) required to deliver final  energy services (e.g., thermal comfort or 
mobility). The key mediator linking all energy conversion steps from 
energy services all the way back to primary resources are energy con-
version  technologies . Energy systems are often further differentiated 
into an  energy supply and an  energy end-use sector. The energy supply 
sector consists of a sequence of elaborate and complex processes for 
extracting energy resources, for converting these into more desirable 
and suitable forms of  secondary energy , and for delivering energy to 
places where demand exists. The part of the energy supply sector deal-
ing with primary energy is usually referred to as  “upstream” activities 
(e.g., oil exploration and production), and those dealing with second-
ary energy as  “downstream” activities (e.g., oil refining and gasoline 
transport and distribution). The energy end-use sector provides energy 
services such as motive power, cooking, illumination, comfortable 
indoor climate, refrigerated storage, and transportation, to name just a 
few examples. The purpose of the entire energy system is the fulfillment 
of demand for energy services in satisfying human needs. 
 2  In the literature (e.g. Rosen,  2010 , Scott,  2007 , Escher, 1983) also the term  energy 
currency is used to highlight the fact that different energy carriers are to a degree 
interchangeable and can be converted to whatever form is most suitable for deliv-
ering a given energy service task. Like monetary currencies, energy currencies are 
also exchangeable (at both an economic and [conversion] efﬁ ciency price). In this 
assessment, the term energy carrier is used throughout. A concise compendium of 
energy-related concepts and terms is given in Cleveland and Morris,  2006 . 
 3  Useful energy can be deﬁ ned as the last measurable energy ﬂ ow before the delivery 
of energy services. 
 Figure 1.1 illustrates schematically the architecture of the energy system 
as a series of linked stages connecting various energy conversion and 
transformation processes that ultimately result in the provision of goods 
and services. A number of examples are given for energy extraction, 
treatment, conversion, distribution, end-use (final energy), and energy 
services in the energy system. The technical means by which each stage 
is realized have evolved over time, providing a mosaic of past evolution 
and future options (Nakicenovic et al.,  1996b ). 
 Primary energy is the energy that is embodied in resources as they 
exist in nature: chemical energy embodied in fossil fuels (coal, oil, and 
natural gas) or biomass, the potential kinetic energy of water drawn 
from a reservoir, the electromagnetic energy of solar radiation, and the 
energy released in nuclear reactions. For the most part, primary energy 
is not used directly but is first converted and transformed into  secondary 
energy such as electricity and fuels such as gasoline, jet fuel, or heating 
oil which serve as energy carriers for subsequent energy conversions or 
market transactions (Nakicenovic et al.,  1996b ). 
 Final energy (“delivered” energy) is the energy transported and distrib-
uted to the point of retail for delivery to final users (firms, individuals, 
or institutions). Examples include gasoline at the service station, elec-
tricity at the socket, or fuel wood in the barn. Final energy is generally 
exchanged in formal monetary market transactions, where also typic-
ally energy taxes are levied. An exception are so-called non-commercial 
fuels – i.e., fuels collected by energy end-users themselves such as fuel 
wood or animal wastes, which constitute important energy sources for 
the poor. 
 The next energy transformation is the conversion of final energy in 
end-use devices such as appliances, machines, and vehicles into  useful 
energy such as the energy forms of kinetic energy or heat. Useful energy 
is measured 3 at the crankshaft of an automobile engine, by the mech-
anical energy delivered by an industrial electric motor, by the heat of a 
household radiator or an industrial boiler, or by the luminosity of a light 
bulb. The application of useful energy provides  energy services such as a 
moving vehicle (mobility), a warm room (thermal comfort), process heat 
(for materials manufacturing), or light (illumination). 
 Energy services are the result of a combination of various tech-
nologies, infrastructures (capital), labor (know-how), materials, and 
energy forms and carriers. Clearly, all these input factors carry a 
price tag and, within each category, are in part substitutable for one 
another. From the consumer’s perspective, the important issues are 
the quality and cost of energy services. It often matters little what 
the energy carrier or the “upstream” primary energy resource was 
that served as input. It is fair to say that most consumers are often 
unaware of the upstream activities of the energy system. The energy 
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Energy Examples
Primary 496 EJ
Secondary 352 EJ
Final  330 EJ
Useful  169 EJ
Conversion
Distribution
End use
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Truck
Car
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Power Plant
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Light
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Kinetic
Coal
Electricity
Electricity
Radiant
Waste and rejected
energy
496 EJ
169 EJ
161 EJ
144 EJ
22 EJ 
 Figure 1.2 |  Global energy ﬂ ows of primary to useful energy, including conversion 
losses (waste and rejected energy), in EJ for 2005. Source: adapted from Nakicenovic 
et al.,  1998 , based on IEA,  2007a ;  2007b ; 2010. 
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 Figure 1.1 |  The energy system: schematic diagram with some illustrative examples of the energy sector and energy end use and services. The energy sector includes energy 
extraction, treatment, conversion, and distribution of ﬁ nal energy. The list is not exhaustive and the links shown between stages are not “ﬁ xed”; for example, natural gas can 
also be used to generate electricity, and coal is not used exclusively for electricity generation. Source: adapted from Nakicenovic et al.,  1996b . 
system is  service driven (i.e., from the bottom-up), whereas energy 
flows are driven by resource availability and conversion processes 
(i.e., from the top-down). Energy flows and driving forces interact 
intimately. Therefore, the energy sector should never be analyzed in 
isolation: it is not sufficient to consider only how energy is supplied; 
the analysis must also include how and for what purposes energy is 
used (Nakicenovic et al.,  1996b ). 
 Figure 1.2 illustrates schematically the major energy flows through 
the global energy system across the main stages of energy trans-
formation, from primary energy to energy services, with typical 
examples. For an exposition of energy units see  Box 1.1 below and 
 Appendix 1.A . 
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 Box 1.1 |  Energy Units and Scales 
 Energy is deﬁ ned as the capacity to do work and is measured in joules (J), where 1 joule is the work done when a force of 1 Newton 
(1 N=1 kg m/s 2 ) is applied over a distance of 1 meter. Power is the rate at which energy is transferred and is commonly measured in 
watts (W), where 1 watt is 1 joule/second. Newton, joule, and watt are deﬁ ned as basic units in the International System of Units (SI). 4 
 Figure 1.3 gives an overview of the most commonly used energy units and also indicates typical (rounded) conversion factors. Next to the 
SI units, other common energy units include kilowatt-hour (kWh), used to measure electricity and derived from the joule (1 kWh – 1000 
Watt-hours – being equivalent to 3600 kilo-Watt-seconds, or 3.6 MJ). In many international energy statistics (e.g., by the IEA and OECD) 
tonnes of oil equivalent (1  toe equals 41.87 x 10 9 J) are used. Some national energy statistics (e.g., in China and India) report tonnes of 
coal equivalent (1  tce equals 29.31 x 10 9 J). 
 The energy content of combustible energy resources (fossil fuels, biomass) is expressed based on either the so-called higher (HHV) or 
lower heating value (LHV). For non-combustible energy resources (nuclear, hydropower, wind energy, etc.) different conventions exist 
to convert those into primary energy equivalents. (For a detailed discussion see  Appendix 1.A ). In this publication non-combustible 
energies are accounted for using the so-called substitution equivalent method, with 1 kWh of nuclear/renewable electricity equivalent to 
some 3 kWh of primary energy equivalent, based on the current global average conversion efﬁ ciency of 35%. Combustible energies are 
reported based on the LHV of fuels. 
1
3
6
9
12
15
18
21
Units
Terawatt (TW) year = 32 EJ 
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
Activities
Burning a small candle = 5.4 kJ
Daily metabolism of adult = 8.6 MJ
1 Liter gasoline = 32 MJ
Cubic meter of natural gas = 38 MJ
Fuel use of car per 100 km = 200 MJ
2005 average US detached single family home = 114 GJ 
Small village in India 500 inhabitants @15 GJ/yr/capita = 7.5 TJ
Power plant 700 MWe annual electricity production = 15.5 PJ 
New York City or Singapore yearly final energy use = 0.8 EJ 
Solar energy reaching the earth surface per hour = 445 EJ 
2005 world primary energy use = 500 EJ
Cooking for one hour = 3 MJ
B747 flight Tokyo-Frankfurt-Tokyo = 9 TJ
Passive-house standard annual energy use < 10 GJ
Joule (J)
Kilojoule (kJ)
Megajoule (MJ)
Gigajoule (GJ)
Terajoule (TJ)
Petajoule (PJ)
Exajoule (EJ)
Zettajoule (ZJ)
British thermal unit (BTU) = 1055J 
Kilowatt-hour (kWh) = 3.6 MJ 
Tonne coal equivalent (tce) = 29 GJ 
Tonne oil equivalent (toe) = 42 GJ 
Barrel oil equivalent (boe) = 5.7 GJ 
Million tonne oil equivalent (Mtoe) = 42 PJ 
Quad (1015 BTU = 1 EJ)
Gigatonne oil equivalent (Gtoe) = 42 EJ 
Newton-meter (Nm)
= Watt-second (Ws) = Joule
 Figure 1.3 |  Illustrative examples of energy units and scales used in the GEA. 
 4  International System of Units,  SI from the French  le Système international d’unités 
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of tonnage, humankind uses each year (values for 2005) some 
12 Gt of fossil energy resources, some 6 Gt of industrial raw 
materials and metals (ores and minerals), 23 Gt of construc-
tion materials (sand, gravel, etc.), and an additional 19 Gt 
of biomass (food, energy, and materials), for a total mater-
ial mobilization of approximately 60 Gt/year, or more than 9 
tonnes/year per capita on average. The use of around 10 Gt of 
energy thus enables the “leverage” of the mining, processing, 
refinement, and use of an additional 50 Gt of materials. 
 Buildings :  The size of the residential and commercial building stock 
worldwide (2005 data) whose internal climate needs to be 
maintained through heating and cooling energy services is 
estimated to be about 150 billion m 2 (including some 116 bil-
lion m 2 residential and 37 billion m 2 commercial floorspace, 
see  Chapter 10 ) which corresponds to approximately 20 m 2 
per person on average. 
 Useful energy as a common energy input denominator minimizes dis-
tortions among different energy service categories, as it most closely 
measures the actual energy service provided.  Chapter 1 has, therefore, 
produced corresponding useful energy estimates based on the 2005 
energy balances published by the International Energy Agency (IEA, 
 2007a and  2007b ) using typical final-to-useful conversion efficien-
cies available in the literature (Eurostat,  1988 ; Rosen,  1992 ; Gilli et al., 
 1996 ; BMME,  1998 ; Rosen and Dincer,  2007 ). This method has some 
drawbacks, as the available energy balances are based on an economic 
sectoral perspective, which does not always perfectly correspond with 
 Table 1.1 |  Estimated levels of energy services and corresponding shares in primary 
energy per service type for the year 2005.  
Energy service
2005 
levels
Units
As a percentage of 
pro-rated primary energy 
use (including upstream 
conversion losses)
Thermal comfort 30 10 15 m 3 K (degree-
volume air)
19%
Sustenance (food) 28 10 18 J (food) 18%
Structural 
materials
15 10 9 MPa 2/3 m 3 
(tensile strength  × 
volume)
14%
Freight transport 46 10 12 ton-km 14%
Passenger 
transport*
32 10 12 passenger-km 14%
Hygiene  1.5 
 2.8 
 10 12 m 3 K 
(temperature 
degree-volume of 
hot water) 
 10 18 Nm (work) 
11%
Communication 280 10 18 bytes 6%
Illumination 480 10 18 lumen-seconds 4%
 *  The original passenger transport data have been corrected by adding non-reported 
categories provided in  Chapter 9 . 
Source: adapted from Cullen and Allwood,  2010 . 
 1.2.2  Energy Services 
 Despite the centrality of energy services for the energy system, their 
measurement and statistical reporting is sparse. As the different types of 
energy services – from passenger and goods transport to illumination, to 
materials produced and recycled, to information communicated – are so 
diverse, activity levels are non-commensurable (i.e., cannot be expressed 
in common units). Hence energy service levels are often assessed via 
their required energy  inputs (useful, final, or primary energy) rather than 
by their actual  outputs. This can distort the picture quite substantially, 
as those energy services with the lowest conversion efficiency (and thus 
highest proportional energy inputs) are over-weighted in the energy 
accounts. Measuring services via inputs rather than outputs can also 
significantly mask the enormous efficiency gains which have historic-
ally characterized technological change in energy end-use applications 
(from candles to white diode lighting, or from horses to electric vehi-
cles), and which generally go unnoticed in long-term estimates of eco-
nomic productivity and welfare growth (see Nordhaus,  1998 ). 
 A notable global assessment of energy service provision is given by Cullen 
and Allwood ( 2010 ) and summarized in  Table 1.1 below. The assessment 
used primary energy as a common energy metric, which is problematic 
for energy services due to the ambiguities of primary energy accounting 
conventions (see  Appendix 1.A ). Using primary energy inputs to charac-
terize energy services also gives greater weight to lesser efficient energy 
service provision chains. A passenger-km traveled by car is accounted 
and weighted for by its much larger primary energy inputs (crude oil) 
compared to a passenger-km traveled by bicycle (food caloric intake). 
The multitude of energy services summarized here can be conveniently 
grouped into three broad categories and are assessed in separate chap-
ters in this publication: Industry ( Chapter 8 ), Transportation ( Chapter 9 ), 
and Buildings ( Chapter 10 ), which are the physical structures in which 
the remainder of energy services are provided. 
 It is useful to put these rather abstract engineering-type summary estimates 
of energy service levels into perspective – for example, on a per capita 
basis for a global population of 6.5 billion in 2005. These illustrative global 
average levels of energy service provision should not distract from the vast 
heterogeneity in levels of energy service provision between rich and poor, 
or between urban and rural populations (see  Section 1.8 below). 
 Transport :  The 46 trillion tonne-km and 32 trillion passenger-km trans-
late into a daily average mobility of some 13 km/day/person, 
and transporting on average 1 tonne/day per capita over a 
distance of some 20 km. 
 Industry :  The structural materials summarized in  Table 1.1 translate in 
absolute terms into close to 2 billion tonnes (Gt) of cement, 1 
Gt of crude steel, some 0.3 Gt of fertilizer, 0.1 Gt of non-fer-
rous metal ores processed, and over 50 million tonnes of plas-
tics produced per year (UN,  2006a ,  2006b ). Estimates of the 
global total material flows reveal a staggering magnitude of 
the industrial metabolism (Krausmann et al.,  2009 ). In terms 
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particular energy service types. 5 It needs to be emphasized that different 
forms of useful energy (such as thermal versus kinetic energy) are not 
interchangeable, even when they are expressed in a common energy 
unit and aggregated. Global totals for useful and final energy inputs per 
energy service category are summarized in  Table 1.2 (see also  Figure 1.5 
below), with regional details given in  Figure 1.6 below. 
 The largest category of energy service demands arise in  industry (62 EJ 
of useful energy in 2005), with the dominant energy service application 
being (high-temperature) industrial process heat associated with the pro-
cessing, manufacturing, and recycling of materials.  Feedstocks refer to 
non-energy uses of energy, where energy carriers serve as a raw mater-
ial (e.g., natural gas used for the manufacture of fertilizers), rather than 
as an input to energy conversion processes proper. Feedstocks are also 
 Table 1.2 |  Energy service levels, world in 2005, as estimated by their corresponding 
useful and ﬁ nal energy inputs (in EJ, and as share of total; see also Footnote 5).  
Energy 
service
Final 
energy
[EJ]
 As percentage of 
total final energy 
[%]
Useful 
energy
[EJ]
 As percentage of 
total useful energy 
[%]
 Transport 
Road 66.9  20.3 13.7  8.1 
Rail 2.3  0.7 1.1  0.7 
Shipping 9.0  2.7 3.0  1.8 
Pipelines 2.9  0.9 0.9  0.5 
Air 10.3  3.1 3.0  1.8 
Total transport 91.4  27.7 21.7  12.9 
 Industry 
Iron and steel 14.4  4.4 11.5  6.8 
Non-ferrous 
metals
4.0  1.2 1.9  1.1 
Non-metallic 
minerals
11.1  3.4 4.5  2.7 
Other 58.7  17.8 44.3  26.3 
Total industry 88.2  26.8 62.2  36.9 
 Other sectors 
Feedstocks 30.2  9.2 25.0  14.8 
Agriculture, 
forestry, ﬁ shery
7.5  2.3 3.0  1.8 
Residential 81.0  24.6 35.6  21.1 
Commercial and 
other
31.4  9.5 21.0  12.5 
Total other 
sectors
150.1  45.5 84.6  50.2 
 Grand Total  329.7  100.0  168.5  100.0 
Source: ﬁ nal energy: data from IEA,  2007a and  2007b ; useful energy:  Chapter 1 
estimation.
associated with industrial activities (the chemical sector) and add another 
25 EJ of useful energy to the 62 EJ of industrial energy service demands. 
 The residential and commercial sectors (some 57 EJ of useful energy 
in 2005) are dominated by the energy use associated with  buildings , 
both in maintaining a comfortable indoor climate (heating and air con-
ditioning), as well as various energy services performed  within buildings 
such as cooking, hygiene (hot water), and the energy use of appliances 
used for entertainment (televisions) or communication (computers, tel-
ephones). Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries are comparatively minor 
in terms of useful energy (3 EJ) and are only summarily included in the 
“other sectors” category here. 
 Transport is comparatively the smallest energy service category when 
assessed in terms of useful energy, with an estimated level of 22 EJ 
(some 13% of total useful energy, but due to low conversion efficien-
cies, some 28% in total primary energy, see  Table 1.1 above). Road 
transportation (cars, two- and three-wheelers, buses, and trucks) are the 
dominant technologies for providing mobility of people and goods. Due 
to the low final-to-useful conversion efficiency associated with internal 
combustion engines (some 20% only, with 80% lost as waste heat of 
engines and associated with friction losses of drive trains), road trans-
port accounts for only 8% of useful energy but for approximately 20% 
of total final energy. This example once more highlights the value of 
an energy service perspective (Haas et al.,  2008 ) on the energy sys-
tem, by looking at service outputs rather than final or primary energy 
inputs that overemphasize the least efficient energy end-use applica-
tions. Nonetheless, it needs to be noted (see the discussion below) that 
transportation is one of the fastest growing energy demand categories. 
This adds further emphasis on efforts to improve transport energy effi-
ciency, which has both technological (more efficient vehicles), as well as 
behavioral and lifestyle dimensions (changing mobility patterns, shifts 
between different transport modes – e.g., by using public transportation 
or bicycles instead of private motorized vehicles). 
 Global trends since 1971 for different energy service categories and in 
measuring final energy inputs are shown in  Figure 1.4 . 
 1.2.3  From Energy Services to Primary Energy 
 Figure 1.5 illustrates the interlinkages of global energy flows from useful 
energy up to the level of primary energy, and also shows major energy 
carriers and transformations. Different primary energies require differ-
ent energy system structures to match the demand for type and quality 
of energy carriers and energy forms with available resources. 
 As a result, there is great variation in the degree and type of energy conver-
sions among different fuels in the global energy system. At the one extreme, 
biomass is largely used in its originally harvested form and burned directly 
without intervening energy conversions. At the other extreme are nuclear, 
hydropower, and modern renewables that are not used in their original 
 5  For instance, transport energy use is reported by mode of transport (road, rail, sea, 
air) in the underlying IEA statistics, which does not allow differentiation between 
passenger and goods transport. 
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resource state but converted into electricity. Electricity is the energy carrier 
with the highest versatility of providing different energy forms required for 
various energy services (heat, light, mobility). Crude oil also needs to be 
converted (refined) to the liquid fuels required for energy end-uses (gas-
oline, diesel, kerosene, for cars, trucks, and aircraft), or for further secondary 
energy conversions (e.g., fuel oil-fired power plants generating electricity). 
Coal is a major input for electricity generation and for specific industrial 
uses (metallurgy) but is not often used in direct form outside these two 
applications (remaining uses for residential heating/cooking are declining 
rapidly due to air pollution concerns). Conversely, natural gas is a major 
energy carrier directly used as final energy and for end-uses, mainly due 
to its convenience (grid delivered, no combustion ashes to dispose of) and 
cleanliness. Natural gas is also increasingly being used in electricity gen-
eration, where the advent of highly efficient combined cycle power plants 
with flat economies of scale (i.e., costs per MW capacity are not significantly 
different across different plant sizes) allows fast construction of modular 
units. Due to the low emission characteristics of these highly efficient con-
version processes, plants can also often be located in high demand density 
areas, thus opening up the possibility of using waste heat from electricity 
generation for industrial and residential customers, a scheme known as 
 cogeneration or combined heat and power production (CHP). 
 From an energy systems perspective, the electricity sector assumes a 
special role (also the reason why it is discussed in greater depth in 
 Section 1.6.3 on Energy Conversions below.) Electricity generation is the 
energy conversion process that can accommodate the greatest diversity 
of primary energy inputs. As shown in  Figure 1.5 , all primary energy 
carriers enter to different degrees into electricity generation, from bio-
mass, to all fossils, nuclear, hydro, and new renewables. Electricity is 
also a very specific energy carrier: its absolute cleanliness at the point of 
end-use (not necessarily at the point of electricity generation, however) 
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 Figure 1.4 |  Global ﬁ nal energy input into different energy services categories since 1971 (in EJ), by major energy service category. Source: adapted from IEA,  2010 . 
and its high energy quality translate into the greatest versatility and 
flexibility in delivering whatever type of energy form and energy ser-
vice required. However, electricity cannot be stored easily, which means 
that generation needs to follow the inevitable intertemporal variations 
of electricity demand over the seasons, during the day, even during 
minute-intervals. 6 
 Overall, there is great variation in energy systems structures across dif-
ferent regions as a result of differences in the degree of economic devel-
opment, structure of energy demand, and resource availability, among 
others. These differences are summarized at the level of useful, final, 
and primary energy respectively for the 5 GEA regions and the world 
in  Figure 1.6 . 
 1.3  Historic Energy Transitions 
 1.3.1  Transitions in Energy End-Use (United Kingdom) 
 Levels and structure of energy services have changed dramatically since 
the onset of the Industrial Revolution, reflecting population and income 
growth and, above all, technological change. Due to the “granular” 
nature of energy services, the measurement intricacies discussed above, 
and the traditional focus of energy statistics on (primary) energy supply, 
it is not possible to describe long-term transition in energy services and 
 6  The variation in electricity demand over time is enshrined in the concept of load 
curves that describe the instantaneous use of electric power (in Watts or typically 
rather GW) over time (on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis). A cumulative load curve 
over all of the 8760 hours of a year, sorted by declining GW load, yields a  load dur-
ation curve (or cumulative load curve) that helps to design a whole electricity system 
and to dimension different types of power plants used for  peak ,  intermediate , and 
 base load electricity generation. 
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 Figure 1.5 |  Global energy ﬂ ows (in EJ) from primary to useful energy by primary resource input, energy carriers (fuels) and end-use sector applications in 2005. Source: data 
from IEA,  2007a ; b 7 (corrected for GEA primary energy accounting standard), and Cullen and Allwood,  2010 . 
 7  Readers should note some small differences (1–5%) between the 2005 base year 
energy ﬂ ows reported in  Chapter 1 and the ones derived from Chapter’s 17 scen-
ario modeling and reported in the GEA Scenario Data Base. Whereas  Chapter 1 is 
based exclusively on statistics as reported by the International Energy Agency (IEA), 
 Chapter 17 and the GEA Scenario data base also include data revisions and draw 
at times different system boundaries for the accounting of energy ﬂ ows, in line with 
standard energy modeling practices. 
 The largest global differences are for ﬁ nal energy (330 vs. 315 EJ in  Chapters 1 and 
 17 respectively) related to: (a) new improved estimates of non-commercial energy 
use based on household surveys that have revised downwards the IEA statistics 
on residential, traditional biomass use; and (b) different accounting of energy use 
for pipeline transportation, and bunker fuels for international shipping which are 
accounted in  Chapter 17 as energy-sector auto-consumption and at the inter-
national level only whereas in Chapter 1 they are accounted at the national and 
regional levels as ﬁ nal transport energy use. Differences in global primary energy 
are smaller (496 vs. 489 EJ between  Chapters 1 and  17 respectively, for the same 
reasons as outlined above). 
 These small energy accounting differences are within the inevitable uncertainty 
range of international energy statistics (for a review see  Appendix 1.A ) and do not 
diminish the coherence of this Assessment. 
energy end-use on the global scale. Long-term detailed national-level 
analyses are available for the United States (Ayres et al.,  2003 ) and the 
United Kingdom (Fouquet,  2008 ), as well as (for shorter time horizons) in 
the form of useful energy balances for Brazil (BMME,  1998 ). 
 The long-term evolution and transitions in energy end-use and energy ser-
vices is described below for the United Kingdom over a time period of 200 
years. The United Kingdom is used as an illustrative example, not only due 
to the level of detail and time horizon of the original data available, but 
particularly because of its history of being the pioneer of the Industrial 
Revolution, which thus illustrates the interplay of industrialization, income 
growth, and technological change as drivers in energy end-use transitions. 
 Figure 1.7 illustrates the growth in energy service provision for the United 
Kingdom since 1800 by expressing the different energy services in terms of 
their required final energy inputs. Three main periods can be distinguished:
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United Kingdom since 1800, in EJ. Source: data from Fouquet,  2008 . Updates after 
2000 and data revisions courtesy of Roger Fouquet, Basque Centre for Climate Change, 
Bilbao, Spain. 
 a regular expansion of energy services in the 19th century that charac-
terized the emergence of the United Kingdom as a leading industrial 
power, in which growth is dominated by industrial energy service 
demands and to a lesser degree by rapidly rising transportation ser-
vices enabled by the introduction of steam-powered railways; 
 a period of high volatility as a result of cataclysmic political and eco-
nomic events (World War I, the Great Depression of 1929, and World 
War II) that particularly affected industrial production and related 
energy services; and 
 a further (more moderated) growth phase after 1950, again punctu-
ated by periods of volatility, such as the energy crisis of the 1970s 
characterized by the gradual decline of industrial energy services, 
compensated by strong growth in passenger transportation result-
ing from the diffusion of petroleum-based collective, and individual 
transport technologies (buses, aircraft, and cars). 
 At present, levels of energy services appear saturated at a level of above 
6 GJ, or 100 GJ of final energy input equivalent per capita. Industry 
(with an ever declining share) accounts for about 30% of all energy 
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 Figure 1.6 |  World energy use: primary energy (by fuel), ﬁ nal energy (by energy carrier), and useful energy (by sector/type of energy service) for the world and ﬁ ve GEA regions 
for 2005 (in EJ). Source: based on IEA,  2007a and  2007b (corrected for GEA primary accounting standard, see also Footnote 5, above). For a deﬁ nition of the GEA regions, see 
 Appendix 1.B . 
services, residential applications (with a stable share) for another 30%, 
and transportation (with an ever growing share) for about 40% of total 
energy services. 
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 8  There are both direct as well as indirect effects on energy service demands. A larger 
population translates into more food to cook, more people needing housing, etc., and a 
corresponding growth in related energy services. Higher incomes from economic growth 
imply growth in energy service demand in industrial and commercial activities and 
related services. This growth in energy service demand is “indirect” in the sense that 
production-related energy services are embedded in the private consumption of goods 
and services by private households and public services (schools, hospitals, etc.). Lastly, 
higher incomes make traditionally expensive energy services (such as air transportation) 
affordable for larger segments of society, an effect ampliﬁ ed by decreasing prices for 
energy services resulting from energy efﬁ ciency and other technology improvements. 
 9  The “take-back” (or “rebound”) effect describes a situation where an improvement 
in energy efﬁ ciency leads to lower energy costs and hence consumer savings, which 
are often spent on (energy-intensive) consumption activities. Part of the energy sav-
ings is thus “taken back” by changed consumer expenditures. For example, a new, 
more energy-efﬁ cient car, with lowered fuel costs, can lead to driving more, or alter-
natively to spending the saved fuel bill on additional recreational air travel. This 
effect was ﬁ rst postulated by William Stanley Jevons in  1865 (and hence is referred 
to also as “Jevons Paradox,” see also Binswanger,  2001 ). Empirical studies suggest 
that in high-income countries the take-back effect can be anywhere between 0% 
and 40% (see the 2000 special issue of  Energy Policy 28(6–7) and the review in 
Sorell et al.,  2009 ). If absolute reductions of energy use are on the policy agenda, 
compensating for take-back effects leads to increases in energy prices via taxes. 
Studies in developing countries (Roy,  2000 ) – e.g., on compact ﬂ uorescent lighting – 
suggest that take-back effects can approach 100%. In this case, the effect of energy 
efﬁ ciency improvements are less in reductions of total energy use but rather in vastly 
increased human welfare. 
the demand for energy services 8 and the purchasing power of the popu-
lation to afford traditional, as well as novel energy services. 
 Improvements in the energy efficiency of service provision and other 
technological improvements in turn are key factors contributing to the 
significant lowering of energy service prices, which have declined by a 
factor of under 10 for heating to over 70 for lighting since 1800. In short, 
more consumers that became more affluent enjoy increasingly energy-
efficient and cheaper energy services, which fuels growth in energy ser-
vice demand (a positive feedback loop in the terminology of systems 
science). A narrow interpretation of this dynamic process of increasing 
returns to adoption (e.g., costs of technologies and energy services 
decline, the higher their market application) as a simple “take-back” 9 
effect, represent a static “equilibrium” perspective of energy systems 
evolution. The history of technological revolutions in energy services and 
in energy supply suggests rather a “dis-equilibrium” interpretation of 
major energy transitions: the transformation is so far-reaching that the 
ultimate future state of the system could have never been reached by 
incremental improvements in efficiency and costs of existing technolo-
gies and energy services.  “Add as many mail-coaches as you please, you 
will never get a railroad by so doing” (Joseph A. Schumpeter,  1935 ). 
 1.3.2  Transitions in Energy Supply Systems (Global) 
 The history of energy transitions is a story of development interlaced with 
periods of crisis and shortages. The Neolithic revolution brought the first trans-
formational change. Hunters and gatherers settled and turned to agriculture. 
Their energy system relied on harnessing natural energy flows, animal work, 
 Figure 1.8 illustrates the evolution of the determinants of the growth in 
UK energy services and shows the mutually enhancing developments 
that led to the spectacular growth in energy services since 1800 (by a 
factor of 15 when measuring final energy inputs, and much more – per-
haps as much as by a factor of 100 – when considering the significant 
improvements in the efficiency of energy service provision that have 
ranged between a factor of five for transportation, to up to a factor of 
600 for lighting, see Fouquet,  2008 ). Population growth (from 10 million 
to 60 million people) and rising incomes (per capita Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) has grown from some US$3000 at 2005 price levels and 
exchange rates in 1800, to close to US$40,000 at present) increase both 
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 10  See also Perlin ( 1989 ) on the role of wood in the development of civilization. In 
fact, the ﬁ rst coal uses in the UK date back to Roman times, and coal was already 
being used for some industrial applications (e.g., brewing beer) before the Industrial 
Revolution. The absence of new and efﬁ cient end-use technologies for coal use (the 
later steam engine) implied only very limited substitution possibilities of traditional 
biofuel uses by coal before the advent of the Industrial Revolution. 
 11  Note, however, that the fuel wood crises did not cause or induce the numerous 
technological innovations including the steam engine that led to the Industrial 
Revolution. These were not caused by price escalation associated with an early “fuel 
wood peak,” but rather resulted from profound transformations in the social and 
organizational fabric and incentive structures for science and entrepreneurship (see 
Rosenberg and Birdzell,  1986 ). 
 12  Quantitative historical accounts for major industrial countries are given in Gales 
et al.,  2007 , Kander et al.,  2008 , and Warr et al.,  2010 .
and human physical labor to provide the required energy services in the form 
of heat, light, and work. Power densities and availability were constrained 
by site-specific factors, with mechanical energy sources initially limited to 
draft animals and later to water and windmills. The only form of energy con-
version was from chemical energy to heat and light – through burning fuel 
wood, for example, or tallow candles (Nakicenovic et al.,  1998 ). It is esti-
mated that early agricultural societies were based on annual energy flows of 
about 10–20 GJ per capita, two-thirds in the form of food for domesticated 
animals and humans, and the other third in the form of fuel wood and char-
coal for cooking, heating, and early industrial activities such as ore smelting 
(Smil,  2010 ). China already experienced acute wood and charcoal shortages 
in the north of the country by the 13th century. In Europe, and particularly 
in the UK, domestic fuel wood became increasingly scarce and expensive as 
forests were overexploited without sufficient replanting or other conserva-
tion measures (Ponting,  1992 ). 10 
 The fuel crisis was eventually overcome through a radical technological 
end-use innovation: the steam engine powered by coal. 11 The steam 
cycle represented the first conversion of fossil energy sources into work; 
it allowed the provision of energy services to be site-independent, as 
coal could be transported and stored as needed; and it permitted power 
densities previously only possible in exceptional locations of abundant 
hydropower (Smil,  2006 ). Stationary steam engines were first intro-
duced for lifting water from coal mines, thereby facilitating increased 
coal production by making deep-mined coal accessible. Later, they pro-
vided stationary power for what was to become an entirely new form 
of organizing production: the factory system. Mobile steam engines, on 
locomotives and steam ships, enabled the first transport revolution, as 
railway networks were extended to even the most remote locations and 
ships were converted from sail to steam. While the Industrial Revolution 
began in England, it spread 12 throughout Europe, the United States and 
the world. Characteristic primary energy use levels during the “steam 
age,” (the mid-19th century in England), were about 100 GJ/year per 
capita (Nakicenovic et al.,  1998 ). These levels exceed even the current 
average global energy use per capita. By the turn of the 20th century, 
coal had become the dominant source of energy, replacing traditional 
non-fossil energy sources, and supplied virtually all of the primary 
energy needs of industrialized countries. 
 Figure 1.9 shows the exponential growth of global energy use at a rate 
close to 2%/yr since the advent of the Industrial Revolution.  Figure 1.10 
is based on the same data and shows relative shares of different pri-
mary energy sources. Substitution of traditional energy sources by coal 
characterized the first phase of the energy revolution – the “steam revo-
lution” – a transformation that lasted until the early 1920s when coal 
reached its maximal share of close to 50% of global primary energy. 
 The second “grand” energy transformation also lasted for about 70 
years. Primary energy demand increased even more rapidly, reaching 
5% or even 6% growth annually, from the late 1940s to the early 
1970s. This development phase was characterized by increasing diver-
sification of both energy end-use technologies and energy supply 
sources. Perhaps the most important innovations were the introduc-
tion of electricity as an energy carrier which could be easily converted 
to light, heat, or work at the point of end-use, and of the internal com-
bustion engine, which revolutionized individual and collective mobility 
through the use of cars, buses, and aircraft (Nakicenovic et al.,  1998 ). 
Like the transition triggered by the steam engine, this “diversification 
transformation” was led by technological innovations in energy end-
use, such as the electric light bulb, the electric motor, the internal com-
bustion engine, and aircraft, as well as computers and the Internet, 
which revolutionized information and communication technologies. 
 However, changes in energy supply have been equally far-reaching. In 
particular, oil emerged from its place as an expensive curiosity at the 
end of the 19th century to occupy the dominant global position, where 
it has remained for the past 60 years. The expansion of natural gas use 
and electrification are other examples of important changes in energy 
supply in the 20th century. The first electricity generation systems 
were based on the utilization of small-scale hydropower, followed by 
a rapid expansion of thermal power-generating capacity utilizing coal, 
oil, and more recently, natural gas. Commercial nuclear power stations 
were increasingly put into operation in the period from 1970 to 1990. 
Renewable sources other than hydropower have become more inten-
sively explored for electricity generation since the mid-1970s, with 
most of the new capacity being added during the past decade. 
 Despite these fundamental changes in the energy system from supply 
to energy end-use, the dynamics of energy system transformations have 
slowed down noticeably since the mid-1970s.  Figure 1.10 shows that 
after oil reached its peak market share of some 40% during the early 
1970s, the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century saw a stabil-
ization of the historical decline in coal’s market share, and a significant 
slowdown in the market growth for natural gas and nuclear. Since 2000, 
coal has even experienced a resurgence, mostly related to the massive 
expansion of coal-fired power generation in rapidly developing econ-
omies in Asia. 
 The shift from fuels such as coal with a high carbon content to energy 
carriers with a lower carbon content such as natural gas, as well as the 
introduction of near-zero carbon energy sources such as hydropower 
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and nuclear, has resulted in the  decarbonization of energy systems 
(Grubler and Nakicenovic,  1996 ; Grubler,  2008 ). Decarbonization refers 
to the decrease in the specific emissions of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) per 
unit of energy. Phrased slightly differently, it refers to the decrease in 
the carbon intensity of primary or any other energy form.  Figure 1.11 
illustrates the historical trend of global decarbonization since 1850 in 
terms of the average carbon emissions per unit of primary energy (con-
sidering all primary energy sources). The dashed line indicates the same 
trend but excluding biomass CO 2 emissions, assuming they have all 
been taken up by the biosphere under a sustainable harvesting regime 
(biomass regrowth absorbing the CO 2 released from biomass burning). 
Historically, emissions related to land-use changes (deforestation) have 
far exceeded 13 carbon releases from energy-related biomass burning, 
which suggests that in the past, biomass, like fossil fuels, has also con-
tributed significantly to increases in atmospheric concentrations of CO 2 . 
 The global rate of decarbonization has been on average about 0.3% 
annually, about six times too low to offset the increase in global energy 
 13  Cumulative emissions of fossil fuels between 1800 and 2000 are estimated to have 
released some 290 GtC (gigatonnes of elemental carbon – to obtain CO 2 multi-
ply by 44/12, yielding 1060 GtCO 2 ), compared to land-use-related (deforestation, 
but excluding energy-related biomass burning) emissions of some 155 GtC. Total 
cumulative energy-related biomass carbon emissions are estimated at 80 GtC from 
1800 to 2000 (all data from Grubler,  2002 ). Houghton ( 1999 ) estimates a net bio-
spheric carbon ﬂ ux (deforestation plus biomass burning minus vegetation regrowth) 
over the same time period (net emissions) of 125 GtC, which suggests that only a 
maximum (attributing – quite unrealistically – all residual net biospheric uptake to 
fuel wood) of 30 GtC (155 GtC deforestation release minus 125 GtC net biospheric 
emissions), or a maximum of 38% (30/80) from energy-related biomass burning 
has been absorbed by the biosphere historically. In the past, biofuel combustion for 
energy can, therefore, hardly be classiﬁ ed as “carbon neutral.” Evidently, in many 
countries (at least in Northern latitudes) forests and energy biomass are harvested 
currently under sustainable management practices that in many cases (avoiding 
soil carbon releases from changing vegetation cover) will qualify as “carbon neu-
tral.” The extent of current net carbon releases of energy-related biomass burning in 
developing countries remains unknown. 
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use of some 2% annually. Again, the significant slowing of historical 
decarbonization trends since the energy crises of the 1970s is note-
worthy, particularly due to rising carbon intensities in some developing 
regions (IEA,  2009 ), and in general due to the slowed dynamics of the 
global energy system discussed above. 
 Decarbonization can be expected to continue over the next several 
decades as natural gas and non-fossil energy sources increase their 
share of total primary energy use. Some future scenarios (for a review 
see Fisher et al.,  2007 ) anticipate a reversal of decarbonization in the 
long term as more easily accessible sources of conventional oil and gas 
become exhausted and are replaced by more carbon-intensive alter-
natives. Others foresee continuing decarbonization because of further 
shifts to low-carbon energy sources, such as renewables and nuclear 
energy. Nonetheless, virtually all scenarios foresee some increases in 
the demand for energy services as the world continues to develop. 
Depending on the rate of energy efficiency improvement, 14 this mostly 
leads to higher primary energy requirements in the future. As long as 
decarbonization rates do not significantly accelerate, this means higher 
carbon emissions compared to historical experience. 
 1.3.3  Energy and Economic Growth 
 The relationship between economic growth and energy use is multifa-
ceted and variable over time. The relationship is also two-directional: 
provision of adequate, high-quality energy services is a necessary (even 
if insufficient) 15 condition for economic growth. In turn, economic 
growth increases the demand for energy services and the corresponding 
upstream energy conversions and resource use. 
 Figure 1.12 summarizes the long-term history of economic and energy 
development for a few countries for which such long-term data (since 
1800) are available. To separate the impacts of population growth, both 
economic output (GDP) and (primary) 16 energy use are expressed on 
a per capita basis. Thereby, the usual temporal dimension of historical 
comparisons is replaced by an economic development metric in which 
countries are compared at similar levels of per capita incomes (GDP). 
 14  The growth in emissions can be conveniently decomposed by the following identity 
(where annual percentage growth rates are additive) covering their main determi-
nants of emissions and their growth: population, income, energy efﬁ ciency, and car-
bon intensity: CO 2 = Population x GDP/capita x Energy/GDP x CO 2 /Energy (proposed 
by Holdren and Ehrlich,  1971 , and applied for CO 2 by Kaya,  1990 ). Due to spatial 
heterogeneity in trends and variable interdependence, caution is advised in inter-
preting component growth rates of this identity. 
 15  Human (education) and social (functioning institutions and markets) capital as well 
as technology (innovation) are recognized as important determinants of economic 
growth (see Barro,  1997 ). 
 16  The most direct link between energy and economic activity is revealed at the level 
of ﬁ nal energy use. However, historical data are mostly available for primary energy 
use. For the United Kingdom, both primary and ﬁ nal energy (see  Figure 1.7 above) 
are shown. 
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 There are two ways of comparing GDP across different national econ-
omies depending on which exchange rate is used to convert a given 
national currency into a commensurable common currency (usually 
dollar denominated): at market exchange rates (MER) and in terms 
of purchasing power parities (PPP). The former are based on national 
accounts and official market (e.g., bank) exchange rates, while the lat-
ter are calculated based on relative prices for representative baskets 
of goods and services across countries denominated in an accounting 
currency of International$ (that equals the US$ in the United States). At 
present, differences between GDP rates denominated in MER and PPP 
exchange rates are comparatively minor among industrialized coun-
tries, and to simplify the exposition only MER-based GDP values are 
shown for the UK and Japan (MER and PPP GDPs are identical in the 
case of the US by definition). However, differences are significant in the 
case of developing economies (with PPP-based GDPs usually being lar-
ger than MER-based GDPs by a factor of two to three due to the much 
lower domestic price levels in developing countries –and hence the 
higher purchasing power of their population compared to industrial-
ized ones), and, therefore, both GDP measures are shown in the case 
of China and India. 
 Three observations help to understand the relationship between eco-
nomic and energy growth:
 the importance of metrics; 
 the overall positive correlation, that is, however, variable over time; and 
 the distinctive differences in development paths among different coun-
tries and their economies. 
 First, both the starting points and the growth rates (the slopes of the 
trend lines shown in  Figure 1.12 ) of economies are dependent on the 
economic metric chosen for comparing incomes across countries (MER 
or PPP). For instance, China’s and India’s GDP per capita in 1970 are 
 17  Based on MER. Using PPP, Japan’s GDP per capita in 1885 is estimated to have been 
well above $4000 (in 2005International$). 
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 Figure 1.12 |  Primary energy use (GJ) versus GDP (at market exchange rates (MER) in 
2005US$) per capita. Source: USA, Japan: updated from Grubler,  1998 , UK: Fouquet, 
 2008 , India and China: IEA ( 2010 ) and World Bank ( 2010 ). Note: Data are for the 
United States (1800–2008), United Kingdom (primary and ﬁ nal energy, 1800–2008), 
Japan (1922–2008), China (1950–2008), and India (1950–2008). For China and India, 
also GDP at purchasing power parities (PPP, in 2005International$) are shown. 
estimated to have been approximately US$170 and US$250, respect-
ively (in US$2005), based on MER, and $700 and $1000 (in International 
$2005), respectively, when based on PPP, which compares to the GDP of 
the US of approximately US$1000 (at US$2005 rates) of 200 years ago, 
and to that of Japan in 1885. 17 
 Thus, developing countries are by no means in a better position for 
economic “take-off”; they are not comparatively “richer” today than 
today’s industrialized countries were some 100 or even 200 years ago, 
albeit enjoying unique development opportunities due to new technolo-
gies and improved communication and trade flows (Grubler,  2004 ). This 
illustrates the time dimension of economic development that entails 
many decades. Developing countries are today at the beginning of a long 
uphill development path that will require many decades to unfold and 
is also likely to include setbacks, as evidenced by the historical record of 
the industrialized countries. However, overall levels of energy use can be 
expected to increase as incomes rise in developing countries. 
 The overall positive correlation between economic and energy growth 
remains one of the most important “stylized facts” of the energy devel-
opment literature, even if the extent of this correlation and its patterns 
over time are highly variable. Although the pattern of energy use growth 
with economic development is pervasive, there is no unique and univer-
sal “law” that specifies an exact relationship between economic growth 
and energy use over time and across countries. The development tra-
jectory of the US illustrates this point. Over much of the period from 
1800 to 1975, per capita energy use in the US grew nearly linearly with 
rising per capita incomes, punctuated by two major discontinuities: the 
effects of the Great Depression after 1929, and the effects of World War 
II (recognizable by the backward-moving “snarls” in the temporal tra-
jectory of both income and energy use per capita shown in  Figure 1.12 ). 
However, since 1975, per capita energy use has remained remarkably flat 
despite continuing growth in per capita income, illustrating an increas-
ing decoupling of the two variables as a lasting impact of the so-called 
“energy crisis” of the early 1970s, an experience shared by many highly 
industrialized countries. It is also important to recognize significant 
differences in timing. During the 100 years from 1900 to 2000, Japan 
witnessed per capita income growth similar to that experienced by the 
US over 200 years (Grubler,  2004 ). This illustrates yet another limita-
tion of simple inferences: notwithstanding the overall evident coupling 
between economic and energy growth, the growth experiences of one 
country cannot necessarily be used to infer those of another country, 
neither in terms of speed of economic development, nor in terms of how 
much growth in energy use such development entails. 
 Lastly, there is a persistent difference between development trajectories 
spanning all of the extremes from “high energy intensity” (the US) at 
one end of the scale to “high energy efficiency” (Japan) at the other 
(see also the discussion on energy intensities in  Section 1.4.4 below). 
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 18  Similar concepts are captured by the term “load factor” referring to the capacity 
utilization of plant and equipment. In typical commuting situations in industrialized 
countries there are no more than 1.2 passengers per automobile, which is a lower 
load factor than for 2-wheelers (bicycles and scooters) in most cities of developing 
countries. 
The relationship between energy and economic growth thus depends 
on numerous and variable factors. It depends on initial conditions (e.g., 
as reflected in natural resource endowments and relative price struc-
tures) and the historical development paths followed that lead to dif-
ferent settlement patterns, different transport requirements, differences 
in the structure of the economy, and so on. This twin dependency on 
initial conditions and the development paths followed to explain dif-
ferences among systems is referred to as “path dependency” (Arthur, 
 1989 ). Path dependency implies considerable inertia in changing devel-
opment paths, even as conditions prevailing at specific periods in his-
tory change – a phenomenon referred to as “lock-in” (Arthur,  1994 ). 
Path dependency and lock-in in energy systems arise from differences 
in initial conditions (e.g., resource availability and other geographical, 
climatic, economic, social, and institutional factors) that in turn are per-
petuated by differences in policy and tax structures, leading to differ-
ences in spatial structures, infrastructures, and consumption patterns. 
These in turn exert an influence on the levels and types of technologies 
used, both by consumers and within the energy sector, that are costly to 
change quickly owing to high sunk investment costs, hence the frequent 
reference to “technological lock-in” (Grubler,  2004 ). 
 The concepts of path dependency and technological lock-in help to 
explain the persistent differences in energy use patterns among coun-
tries and regions even at comparable levels of income, especially when 
there are no apparent signs of convergence. For instance, throughout 
the whole period of industrialization and at all levels of income, per cap-
ita energy use has been lower in Japan than in the US (Grubler,  2004 ). 
The critical question for emerging economies such as China and India 
is, therefore, what development path they will follow in their develop-
ment and what policy leverages exist to avoid lock-in in energy- and 
resource-intensive development paths that ultimately will be unsus-
tainable, which puts  energy efficiency at the center of the relationship 
between the economic and energy systems. 
 1.4  Energy Efficiency and Intensity 
 1.4.1  Introduction 
 Energy is conserved in every conversion process or device. It can neither 
be created nor destroyed, but it can be converted from one form into 
another. This is the First Law of Thermodynamics. For example, energy in 
the form of electricity entering an electric motor results in the desired 
output – say, kinetic energy of the rotating shaft to do work – and in 
losses in the form of heat as the undesired by-product caused by electric 
resistance, magnetic losses, friction, and other imperfections of actual 
devices. The energy entering a process equals the energy exiting. Energy 
efficiency is defined as the ratio of the desired (usable) energy output 
to the energy input. In the electric motor example, this is the ratio of 
the shaft power to the energy input electricity. Or in the case of natural 
gas for home heating, energy efficiency is the ratio of heat energy sup-
plied to the home to the calorific value of the natural gas entering the 
furnace. This definition of energy efficiency is sometimes called  first-law 
efficiency (Nakicenovic et al.,  1996b ). 
 A more efficient provision of energy services not only reduces the 
amount of primary energy required but, in general, also reduces costs 
and adverse environmental impacts. Although efficiency is an important 
determinant of the performance of the energy system, it is not the only 
one. In the example of a home furnace, other considerations include 
investment, operating costs, lifetime, peak power, ease of installation 
and operation, and other technical and economic factors (Nakicenovic 
et al.,  1996b ). For entire energy systems, other considerations include 
regional resource endowments, conversion technologies, geography, 
information, time, prices, investment finance, age of infrastructure, and 
know-how. 
 As an example of energy chain efficiency,  Figure 1.13 illustrates the 
energy flows in the supply chain for illumination services (lighting). In 
this example, electricity is generated from coal in a thermal power sta-
tion and transmitted and distributed to the point of end-use, where it 
is converted to light radiation by means of an incandescent light bulb. 
Only about 1% of the primary energy is transformed to illumination ser-
vices provided to the end-user. In absolute terms, the majority of losses 
occur at the thermal power plant. The conversion of chemically stored 
energy from the coal into high-quality electricity comes along with the 
production of a significant amount of low-grade heat as a by-product 
of the process. Idle losses 18 at the point of end-use reflect the amount 
of time when the light bulb is switched on with the illumination service 
not being needed at that moment – for example, when the user is tem-
porarily not present in the room. 
 In this example, abundant opportunities for improving efficiency exist 
at every link in the energy chain. They include shifting to more efficient 
fuels (e.g., natural gas) and more efficient conversion, distribution, and 
end-use technologies (e.g., combined cycle electricity generation, fluor-
escent or LED lighting technologies), as well as behavioral change at the 
point of end-use (e.g., reducing idle times). Integration of energy sys-
tems is another approach to reduce losses and improve overall system 
efficiency. An example of such system integration is combined heat and 
power production, where low temperature residual heat from thermal 
power production is utilized for space heating, a technique which can 
raise overall first-law fuel efficiency up to 90% (Cames et al.,  2006 ). At 
the point of end-use, idle losses can be reduced through changed user 
behavior and control technology such as building automation systems 
that adapt energy services to the actual needs of the user. 
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 1.4.2  First-Law Efficiencies 
 In 2005, the global efficiency of converting primary energy sources to final 
energy forms, including electricity, was about 67% (330 EJ over 496 EJ; see 
 Figure 1.2 above). The efficiency of converting final energy forms into use-
ful energy is lower, with an estimated global average of 51% (169 EJ over 
330 EJ; see  Figure 1.2 ). The resulting average global efficiency of convert-
ing primary energy to useful energy is then the product of the above two 
efficiencies, or 34%. In other words, about two-thirds of global primary 
energy use does not end up as useful energy input for providing energy 
services but is dissipated to the environment in the form of waste heat (or 
what is colloquially termed energy “losses”). The ultimate efficiency of the 
energy system in the provision of energy services cannot be determined 
by calculations based on the First Law of Thermodynamics but requires an 
extension of the discussion to the Second Law of Thermodynamics. 
 1.4.3  Second-Law Efficiencies and Exergy 
 How much energy is needed for a particular energy service? The answer 
to this question is not so straightforward. It depends on the type and 
quality of the desired energy service, the type of conversion technol-
ogy, the fuel, including the way the fuel is supplied, and the surround-
ings, infrastructures, and organizations that provide the energy service. 
Initially, energy efficiency improvements can be achieved in many 
instances without elaborate analysis through common sense, good 
housekeeping, and leak-plugging practices. Obviously, energy service 
efficiencies improve as a result of sealing leaking window frames or the 
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installation of a more efficient furnace. Or if the service is transporta-
tion, getting to and from work, for example, using a transit bus jointly 
with other commuters is more energy-efficient than taking individual 
automobiles. After the easiest improvements have been made, however, 
the analysis must go far beyond energy accounting. 19 
 Here the concept that something may get lost or destroyed in every 
energy device or transformation process is useful. This “something” is 
called “availability,” which is the capacity of energy to do work. Often 
the availability concept is called “exergy.” 20 
 The following example should help clarify the difference between energy 
and exergy. A well-insulated room contains a small container of kero-
sene surrounded by air. The kerosene is ignited and burns until the con-
tainer is empty. The net result is a small temperature increase of the air in 
the room (“enriched” with the combustion products). Assuming no heat 
leaks from the room, the total quantity of energy in the room has not 
changed. What has changed, however, is the quality of energy. The initial 
fuel has a greater potential to perform useful tasks than the resulting 
 19  This section updates and expands on material that was ﬁ rst published in Nakicenovic 
et al. ( 1996b ). 
 20  Exergy is deﬁ ned as the maximum amount of energy that under given (ambient) 
thermodynamic conditions can be converted into any other form of energy; it is also 
known as “availability” or “work potential.” Therefore, exergy deﬁ nes the minimum 
theoretical amount of energy required to perform a given task. The ratio of theor-
etical minimum energy use for a particular task to the actual energy use for the 
same task is called exergy or  second-law efﬁ ciency (based on the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics). See also Wall,  2006 . 
Energy Primer Chapter 1
118
slightly warmer air mixture. For example, one could use the fuel to gener-
ate electricity or operate a motor vehicle. The scope of a slightly warmed 
room to perform any useful task other than space conditioning (and so 
provide thermal comfort) is very limited. In fact, the initial potential of 
the fuel or its exergy has been largely destroyed. 21 Although energy is 
conserved, exergy is destroyed in all real-life energy conversion proc-
esses. This is what the Second Law of Thermodynamics says. 
 Another, more technical, example should help clarify the difference 
between the first-law (energy) and second-law (exergy) efficiencies. 
Furnaces used to heat buildings are typically 70% to 80% efficient, with 
the latest best-performing condensing furnaces operating at efficiencies 
greater than 90%. This may suggest that minimal energy savings should 
be possible, considering the high first-law efficiencies of furnaces. Such a 
conclusion is incorrect. The quoted efficiency is based on the specific pro-
cess being used to operate the furnace – combustion of fossil fuel to prod-
uce heat. Since the combustion temperatures in a furnace are significantly 
higher than those desired for the energy service of space heating, the ser-
vice is not well matched to the source and the result is an inefficient appli-
cation of the device and fuel. Rather than focusing on the efficiency of a 
given technique for the provision of the energy service of space heating, 
one needs to investigate the theoretical limits of the efficiency of supply-
ing heat to a building based on the actual temperature regime between 
the desired room temperature, and the heat supplied by a technology. The 
ratio of theoretical minimum energy use for a particular task to the actual 
energy use for the same task is called exergy or  second-law efficiency. 
 Consider the following case. To provide a temperature of 30°C to a 
building while the outdoor temperature is 4°C requires a theoretical 
minimum of one unit of energy input for every 12 units of heat energy 
delivered to the indoors. To provide 12 units of heat with an 80% effi-
cient furnace, however, requires 12/0.8, or 15 units of heat. The cor-
responding second-law efficiency is the ratio of theoretical minimum to 
actual energy use – i.e., 1/15 or 7%. 
 The first-law efficiency of 80% gives a misleading impression that only 
modest improvements are possible. The second-law efficiency of 7% 
says that a 15-fold reduction in final heating energy is theoretically pos-
sible by changing technologies and practices. 22 In practice, theoretical 
maxima cannot be achieved. More realistic improvement potentials 
might be in the range of half of the theoretical limit. In addition, further 
improvements in the efficiency of supplying  services are possible by task 
changes – for instance, in reducing the thermal heat losses of the build-
ing to be heated via better insulation of walls and windows. 
 What is the implication of the Second Law of Thermodynamics for 
energy efficiencies? First of all, it is not sufficient to account for energy-
in versus energy-out ratios without due regard for the quality difference – 
i.e., the exergy destroyed in the process. Minimum exergy destruction 
means an optimal match between the energy service demanded and 
the energy source. Although a natural gas heating furnace may have a 
(First-Law) energy efficiency of close to 100%, the exergy destruction 
may be very high depending on the temperature difference between the 
desired room temperature and the temperature of the environment. The 
Second-Law efficiency, defined as exergy-out over exergy-in, in this nat-
ural gas home heating furnace example is some 7% – i.e., 93% of the 
original potential of doing useful work (exergy) of the natural gas enter-
ing the furnace is destroyed. Here we have a gross mismatch between 
the natural gas potential to do useful work, and the low temperature 
nature of the energy service space conditioning. 
 There are many examples for exergy analysis of individual conversion 
devices (e.g., losses around a thermal power plant) as well as larger energy 
systems (cities, countries, the entire globe). This literature is reviewed in 
detail in Nakicenovic ( 1996b ). Estimates of global and regional primary-
to-service exergy efficiencies vary typically from about 10 to as low as a 
few percent of the thermodynamically maximum feasible (see also Ayres, 
 1989 , Gilli et al.,  1996 , and Nakicenovic et al.,  1996a ). 
 The theoretical potential for efficiency improvements is thus very large, 
and current energy systems are nowhere close to the maximum lev-
els suggested by the Second Law of Thermodynamics. However, the full 
realization of this potential is impossible to achieve. First of all, friction, 
resistance, and similar losses can never be totally avoided. In addition, 
there are numerous barriers and inertias to be overcome, such as social 
behavior, vintage structures, financing of capital costs, lack of informa-
tion and know-how, and insufficient policy incentives. 
 The principal advantage of second-law efficiency is that it relates actual 
efficiency to the theoretical (ideal) maximum. Although this theoretical 
maximum can never be reached, low exergy efficiencies identify those 
areas with the largest potentials for efficiency improvement. For fossil 
fuels, this implies the areas that also have the highest emission miti-
gation potentials. A second advantage of exergy efficiency is that the 
concept can be transferred to the assessment of energy service provi-
sion, which is not possible in first-law efficiency calculations. By com-
paring an actual configuration (a single driver in an inefficient car) with 
a theoretically ideal situation (a fuel-efficient car with five people in 
it), respective exergetic service efficiencies while maintaining the same 
type of energy service (i.e., not assuming commuting by bicycle) can 
be determined. This is important, especially as the available literature 
 21  Alternative example: In terms of energy, 1 kWh of electricity and the heat contained 
in 5 kg of 20°C (raised from 0°C) water are equal, i.e. 3.6 MJ. At ambient conditions, 
it is obvious that 1 kWh of electricity has a much larger potential to do work (e.g., to 
turn a shaft, provide light, or allow to run a computer) than the 5 kg of 20°C water 
that cannot perform any useful work. 
 22  For example, instead of combusting a fossil fuel, Goldemberg et al. ( 1988 ) give the 
example of a heat pump that extracts heat from a local environment (outdoor air, 
indoor exhaust air, ground water) and delivers it into the building. A heat pump operat-
ing on electricity can supply 12 units of heat for three to four units of electrical energy. 
The second-law efﬁ ciency then improves to 25–33% for this particular task – still con-
siderably below the theoretical maximum efﬁ ciency. Not accounted for in this example, 
however, are the energy losses during electricity generation. Assuming a modern gas-
ﬁ red combined cycle power plant with 50% efﬁ ciency, the overall efﬁ ciency gain is still 
higher by a factor of two compared to a gas furnace heating system. 
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suggests that efficiencies in energy end-uses (in the conversion of final 
to useful energy and of useful energy to energy services) are particularly 
low (see  Figure 1.14 ). 
 1.4.4  Energy Intensities 
 A related concept to that of energy efficiency is that of energy inten-
sity. Instead of measuring input/output relations in energy terms, as is 
the case for energy efficiency, energy inputs are divided by a range of 
appropriate activity indicators that represent the energy service provided 
(such as tonnes of steel produced, vehicle-km driven, floorspace inhab-
ited, monetary measures of output, number of employees, etc.) to yield 
energy intensity indicators. Such comparative benchmarking across coun-
tries, industries, or products, yields valuable insights into potentials for 
efficiency improvements related to various activities (comparing current 
intensities to best practice), and is applied widely in the corresponding 
energy efficiency improvement and greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation lit-
erature (see Fisher et al.,  2007 ; and the GEA end-use chapters  8 ,  9 , and  10 
in this publication). Extending this concept to entire energy systems and 
economies yields a widely used indicator of energy intensity, per unit of 
economic activity (GDP, which is the monetary quantification of all goods 
and services consumed in an economy in a given year subject to market 
transactions). 23 This parsimonious indicator is appealing because of its 
relative simplicity (usually a single number) and seeming ease of compar-
ability across time and across different systems (global and/or national 
economies, regions, cities, etc.). However, its simplicity comes at a price. 
 23  Like energy, GDP is a  ﬂ ow variable and, therefore, does not measure wealth or wel-
fare (which are  stock variables). 
 The measurement of GDP through market transactions (sales/purchases of goods 
and services) is at the same time a strength (measurability by statistical ofﬁ ces) and a 
weakness of the concept, as excluding non-market transactions (such as household and 
voluntary work that should increase GDP if valued monetarily) as well as environmental 
externalities (the negative impacts of pollution, congestion, etc. that would lower GDP). 
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First, the indicator is affected by a number of important measurement 
and definitional issues (see the discussion below). Second, the underlying 
factors for explaining differences in absolute levels of energy intensities 
across economies and their evolution over time requires detailed, further 
in-depth analysis using a range of additional explanatory variables. They 
cannot be distilled from an aggregate indicator such as energy intensity 
of the national or global GDP. 
 The literature on energy intensities, their trends, and drivers is vast 
(for useful introductory texts see, e.g., Schipper and Myers,  1992 ; 
Nakicenovic et al.,  1996b ; Greening et al.,  1997 ; Schäfer,  2005 ; Baksi 
and Green,  2007 ; Gales et al.,  2007 ). Apart from definitional, accounting, 
and measurement conventions, differences in energy intensities have 
been explained by a set of interrelated variables including demographics 
(size, composition, and densities – e.g., urban versus rural population), 
economics (size and structure of economic activities/sectors – e.g., the 
relative importance of energy-intensive industries versus energy-exten-
sive services in an economy; per capita income levels), technology and 
capital vintages (age and efficiency of the production processes, trans-
port vehicles, housing stock, etc.), geography and climate, energy prices 
and taxes, lifestyles, and policies, just to name the major categories. 
 In terms of energy and economic accounting, energy intensities are 
affected by considerable variation depending on which particular 
accounting convention is used (and which is often not disclosed promi-
nently in the reporting reference). For energy, the largest determining 
factors are whether primary or final energy is used in the calculations, 
and if non-commercial (traditional biomass or agricultural residues, 
which are of particular importance in developing countries) are included 
or not. Another important determinant is which accounting method is 
used for measuring primary energy (see  Appendix 1.A ). For GDP, the 
largest difference in energy intensity indicators is the conversion rate 
used for expressing a unit of national currency in terms of an interna-
tionally comparable currency unit based on either MER or PPP exchange 
rates (see the discussion in  Section 1.3.3 above). 
 Figure 1.15 illustrates some of the differences in the evolution of his-
torical primary energy intensity for four major economies in the world: 
China, India, Japan, and the United States. It shows a number of differ-
ent ways of measuring energy intensity of GDP. The first example can 
be best illustrated for the US (where there is no difference between the 
MER and PPP GDP measure by definition). 
 The (thin red) curve shows the  commercial energy intensity. Commercial 
energy intensities increase during the early phases of industrialization, 
as traditional and less efficient energy forms are replaced by commercial 
energy. When this process is completed, commercial energy intensity 
peaks and proceeds to decline. This phenomenon is sometimes called 
the “hill of energy intensity.” Reddy and Goldemberg ( 1990 ) and many 
others have observed that the successive peaks in the procession of 
countries achieving this transition are ever lower, indicating a possible 
catch-up effect and promising further energy intensity reductions in 
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developing countries that still have to reach the peak. In the US, for 
example, the peak of commercial energy intensity occurred during the 
1910s and was higher than Japan’s subsequent peak, which occurred 
in the 1970s (Nakicenovic et al.,  1998 ). More important than this “hill” 
in commercial energy intensities is, however, a pervasive trend toward 
overall lower  total energy (including also non-commercial energy) inten-
sities over time and across all countries. 
 Figure 1.15 also shows energy intensities for China and India for two 
alternative measures of converting national GDP to an internationally 
comparable level: using MER or PPP exchange rates. In the cases of 
India and China, MER energy intensities are very high, resembling 
the energy intensities of the now industrialized countries more that 
100 years ago (Nakicenovic et al.,  1998 ). This gives the appearance 
of very low energy efficiency in producing a unit of economic out-
put in China and India, and by implication in other emerging and 
developing countries. However, China and India’s PPP-measured 
GDPs are much higher than official MER-based GDPs suggest (and 
resulting PPP-based energy intensities much lower) due to generally 
much lower prices in the two countries compared to industrialized 
countries. This translates into a more favorable PPP exchange rate 
of the local currency compared to MER (often by a factor of two to 
 24  As by deﬁ nition an International$ used for PPP accounting is equal to one US$, no 
distinction is made between PPP- and MER-based intensities in the case of the US in 
 Figure 1.15 . 
 25  Traditional biomass fuels are often collected by end-users themselves and thus not 
exchanged via formal market transactions. Their collection costs in terms of effort 
and time can be substantial but are not reﬂ ected in ofﬁ cial GDP estimates. 
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three). Consequently, with the same dollar amount, a consumer can 
purchase more goods and services in developing countries than in 
more industrialized countries. PPP-measured energy intensities are 
thus generally much lower for developing countries, indicating sub-
stantially higher energy efficiencies in these countries than would be 
calculated using MER. 
 The substantially lower energy intensity of GDP when expressed in 
terms of PPP rather than MER should be contrasted with the much 
lower energy intensity improvement  rates in terms of PPP compared 
to energy intensities based on MER. The differences can indeed be 
substantial. In 2005 the energy intensity in China was about 33 MJ/
US$2005 for MER, with an average historical reduction rate of 3.3%/
year since 1971, compared with about 14 MJ per 2005International$ 
for PPP for the same year and an improvement rate of 1.9%/year. Since 
1971, China’s per capita GDP in terms of MER has grown by some 7%/
year, whereas the estimated per capita GDP in PPP terms has grown by 
some 5%/year, compared to a growth rate of per capita primary energy 
use of some 3%/year (from 20 GJ in 1971 to 57 GJ in 2005 and 71 GJ 
in 2008). Therefore, caution is needed when interpreting the apparent 
rapid energy intensity improvements, measured by MER-based GDPs, 
which are reported for some countries. In theory, as countries develop 
and their domestic prices converge toward international levels, the 
difference between the two GDP measures largely disappears (see the 
case of Japan in  Figure 1.15 ). 24 
 Adding traditional (non-commercial) energy 25 to commercial energy 
reflects total primary energy requirements and yields a better and more 
powerful measure of overall energy intensity. Total energy intensities 
generally decline for all four countries in  Figure 1.15 . There are excep-
tions, including periods of increasing energy intensity that can last for 
a decade or two. This was the case for the US around 1900 and China 
during the early 1970s. Recently, energy intensities are (temporarily) 
increasing in the economies in transition, due to economic slowdown 
and depression (declining per capita GDP). In the long run, however, 
the development is toward lower energy intensities. Data for countries 
with long-term statistical records show improvements in total energy 
intensities by more than a factor of five since 1800, corresponding to 
an average decline of total energy intensities of about 1%/year (Gilli 
et al.,  1990 ; Nakicenovic et al.,  1998 ; Fouquet,  2008 ). Improvement rates 
can be much faster, as illustrated in the case of China discussed above 
(2–3%/year for PPP- and MER-based energy intensities, respectively. 
Energy intensities in India have improved by 0.8%/year (PPP-based) to 
1.5%/year (MER-based) over the period from 1970 to 2005. The much 
higher improvement rates of China compared to India reflects both a 
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less favorable (less energy-efficient) starting point as well as much faster 
GDP per capita growth in China than in India. Faster economic growth 
leads to a faster turnover of the capital stock of an economy, thus offer-
ing more opportunities to switch to more energy-efficient technologies. 
The reverse side also applies, as discussed above for the economies in 
transition (Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union): with declining 
GDP, energy intensities deteriorate – i.e., increase rather than decline. 
 It is also useful to look at long-term energy intensity trends using a more 
appropriate “development” metric than a simple calendar year. Even if 
in many aspects not perfect, income per capita can serve as a useful 
proxy for the degree of economic development. From this perspective, 
the vast differences in energy intensities between industrialized and 
developing countries are  development gaps rather than inefficiencies 
in developing economies. For similar levels of income, energy intensities 
of developing countries are generally in line with the levels that pre-
vailed in industrialized countries about a century ago, when these had 
similar low income levels (see lower graph,  Figure 1.15 ). 
 However, such a perspective also reveals more clearly distinctive differ-
ences in development patterns spanning all the extremes between “high 
intensity” (e.g., the US) and “high efficiency” (e.g., Japan). The United 
States has had at all times significantly higher energy intensities than 
other countries, reflecting its unique condition of originally prevailing 
resource abundance, 26 coupled with a vast territory, and a comparative 
labor shortage that led to early mechanization and the corresponding 
substitution of human and animal labor by mechanical energy powered 
by (cheap) fossil fuels (David and Wright,  1996 ). The concepts of path 
dependency and lock-in (introduced above) describe these differences 
in development patterns and trajectories. Current systems are deeply 
rooted in their past development history. Initial conditions and incen-
tives in place (such as relative prices) structure development in a par-
ticular direction, which is perpetuated (path dependent), ultimately 
leading to lock-in – i.e., the resistance to change of existing systems 
(due to, e.g., settlement patterns, industrial structure, lifestyles). From 
this perspective, a rapid convergence of levels of energy intensity and 
efficiency across all countries would indeed be a formidable challenge, 
notwithstanding that all systems can improve their energy intensities 
toward an “endless” innovation “frontier” in energy efficiency. 
 Energy intensity improvements can continue for a long time to come. 
As discussed above, the theoretical potential for energy efficiency 
and intensity improvements is very large; current energy systems are 
nowhere close to the maximum levels suggested by the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics. Although the full realization of this potential is impos-
sible, many estimates reflecting the potential of new technologies and 
opportunities for energy systems integration indicate that the improve-
ment potential might be large indeed – an improvement by a factor of 
ten or more could be possible in the very long run (see Ayres,  1989 ; Gilli 
et al.,  1990 ; Nakicenovic.,  1993 ;  1998 ; Wall,  2006 ). Thus, reductions in 
energy intensity can be viewed as an endowment, much like other nat-
ural resources, that needs to be discovered and applied. 
 1.5  Energy Resources 
 1.5.1  Introduction 
 Energy  resources – or rather  occurrences – are the stocks (e.g., oil, coal, 
uranium) and flows (e.g., wind, sunshine, falling water) of energy offered 
by nature. Stocks, by definition, are exhaustible, and any resource con-
sumption will reduce the size of the concerned stock. Flows, in turn, are 
indefinitely available as long as their utilization does not exceed the rate 
at which nature provides them. While the concept of stocks and flows 
is simple and thus intriguing, it quickly becomes complex and confusing 
once one is tasked with their quantification (the size of the “barrel”) or 
recoverability (“the size and placement of the tap”). Crucial questions 
relate to the definition and characterization of, say, hydrocarbons in 
terms of chemical composition, concentration of geological occurrence, 
investment in exploration, or technology for extraction. Just by account-
ing for lowest concentration occurrences or lowest-density flow rates, 
stocks and flows assume enormous quantities. However, these have lit-
tle relevance for an appreciation of which parts of the stocks and flows 
may be or become practically accessible for meeting societies’ energy 
service needs. Private- and public-sector energy resource assessments, 
therefore, distinguish between  reserves and  resources , while occur-
rences are usually ignored for reasons of lack of technical producibility 
or economic attractiveness. Put differently, what is the benefit of know-
ing the size of the barrel when no suitable tap is available? 27 
 Despite being used for decades, the terms energy  reserves and  resources 
are not universally defined and thus poorly understood. There are many 
methodological issues, and there is no consensus on how to compare 
reserves and resources across different categories fairly. A variety of 
terms are used to describe energy reserves and resources, and different 
authors and institutions have different meanings for the same terms 
depending on their different purpose. 
 The World Energy Council (WEC,  1998 ) defined resources as “the occur-
rences of material in recognizable form.” For oil, it is essentially the 
amount of oil in the ground. Reserves represent a portion of resources 
and is the term used by the extraction industry.  Reserves are the amount 
currently technologically and economically recoverable (WEC,  2007 ). 
 Resources are detected quantities that cannot be profitably recovered 
with current technology but might be recoverable in the future, as well 
as those quantities that are geologically possible but yet to be found. 
 26  A similar case can be found in the development history of the former Soviet Union, 
whose long-term economic data are, however, too uncertain for cross-country com-
parisons of energy intensity. 
 27  This section updates and expands on material that was ﬁ rst published in Rogner et al. 
( 2000 ). 
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 Figure 1.16 |  Principles of resource classiﬁ cation, illustrating the deﬁ nition of the 
three fundamental concepts: reserves, resources, and occurrences. Source: adapted 
from McKelvey,  1967 . 
 28  Physical and economic limitations of the  rates of extraction do not enter the estima-
tions of these stock variables. 
 Occurences include both reserves and resources as well as all additional 
quantities estimated to exist in the Earth’s crust. 
 BP ( 2010a ) notes that “proven reserves of oil are generally taken to be 
those quantities that geological and engineering information indicate 
with reasonable certainty, which can be recovered in the future from 
known reservoirs under existing economic and operating conditions.” 
Other common terms include probable reserves, indicated reserves, and 
inferred reserves – that is, hydrocarbon occurrences that do not meet 
the criteria of proven reserves. Undiscovered resources are what remain 
and, by definition, one can only speculate on their existence. Ultimately 
recoverable resources are the sum of identified reserves and the pos-
sibly recoverable fraction of undiscovered resources, and generally 
include production to date. 28 
 Then there is the difference between conventional and unconventional 
resources (e.g., oil shale, tar sands, coal-bed methane, methane clath-
rates (hydrates), uranium in black shale or dissolved in sea water). In 
essence, unconventional resources are occurrences in lower concentra-
tions, different geological settings, or different chemical compositions 
than conventional resources. Again, unconventional resource categories 
lack a standard definition, which adds greatly to misunderstandings. 
As the name suggests, unconventional resources generally cannot be 
extracted with technology and processes used for conventional oil, gas, 
or uranium. They require different logistics and cost profiles and pose 
different environmental challenges. Their future accessibility is, there-
fore, a question of technological development – i.e., the rate at which 
unconventional resources can be converted into conventional reserves 
(notwithstanding demand and relative costs). In short, the boundary 
between conventional and unconventional resources is in permanent 
flux. Occurrences are in principle affected by the same dynamics, albeit 
over a much more speculative and long-term time scale. Technologies 
that may turn them into potential resources are currently not in sight, 
and resource classification systems, therefore, separate them from 
resources (often considering occurrences as speculative quantities that 
may not become technologically recoverable over the next 50 years). 
 In short, energy resources and their potential producibility cannot be 
characterized by a simple measure or single numbers. They comprise 
quantities along a continuum in at least three, interrelated, dimensions: 
geological knowledge, economics, and technology. McKelvey ( 1967 ) 
proposed a commonly used diagram with a matrix structure for the 
classification along two dimensions ( Figure 1.16 ): decreasing geological 
certainty of occurrence and decreasing techno-economic recoverabil-
ity (Nakicenovic et al.,  1996b ). The geological knowledge dimension is 
divided into identified and undiscovered resources. Identified resources 
are deposits that have known location, grade, quality, and quantity, or 
that can be estimated from geological evidence. Identified resources are 
further subdivided into demonstrated (measured plus indicated) and 
inferred resources to reflect varying degrees of geological assurance. 
The techno-economic dimension accounts for the feasibility of technical 
recoverability and economic viability of bringing the resource to the 
market place. Reserves are identified resources that are economically 
recoverable at the time of assessment (see the BP definition above). 
 Undiscovered resources are quantities expected or postulated to exist 
under analogous geological conditions. Other occurrences are materi-
als that are too low-grade, or for other reasons not considered tech-
nically or economically extractable. For the most part, unconventional 
resources are included in other occurrences. 
 Reserve and resource estimations, as well as their production costs, are 
subject to continuous revision for several reasons. Production inevita-
bly depletes reserves and eventually exhausts deposits, while success-
ful exploration and prospecting adds new reserves and resources. Price 
increases and production cost reductions expand reserves by moving 
resources into the reserve category and vice versa. Technology is the 
most important force in this process. Technological improvements are 
continuously pushing resources into the reserve category by advanc-
ing knowledge and lowering extraction costs. The outer boundary of 
resources and the interface to other occurrences is less clearly defined 
and often subject to a much wider margin of interpretation and judg-
ment. Other occurrences are not considered to have economic potential 
at the time of classification. Yet over the very long term, technological 
progress may upgrade significant portions of occurrences to resources 
and later to reserves (Rogner et al.,  2000 ). 
 In contrast, long-term supply, given sufficient demand, is a question of 
the replenishment of known reserves with new ones presently either 
unknown, not delineated, or from known deposits presently not produ-
cible or accessible for techno-economic reasons (Rogner,  1997 ; Rogner 
et al.,  2000 ). Here the development and application of advanced explor-
ation and production technologies are essential prerequisites for the 
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 Table 1.3 |  Fossil and uranium reserves, resources and occurrences (in EJ).  
Historical production 
through 2005
Production 
2005
 Cumulative extraction GEA scenarios 
 2005–2100 
[EJ] 
Reserves Resources
Additional 
Occurrences
[EJ] [EJ] [EJ] [EJ] [EJ]
Conventional oil 6 069 147.9 6 600–10 000 4 900–7 610 4 170–6 150
Unconventional oil 513 20.2 2–470 3 750–5 600 11 280–14 800 > 40 000
Conventional gas 3 087 89.8 7 900–11 900 5 000–7 100 7 200–8 900
Unconventional gas 113 9.6 180–8 500 20 100–67 100 40 200–121 900 > 1 000 000
Coal 6 712 123.8 3 300–16 500 17 300–21 000 291 000–435 000
Conventional uranium (b) 1 218 24.7
1 520–28 500
2 400 7 400
Unconventional uranium (c) n.a. – 4 100 > 2 600 000
 (a)  The data reﬂ ect the ranges found in the literature; the distinction between reserves and resources is based on current (exploration and production) technology and market condi-
tions. Resource data are not cumulative and do not include reserves. 
 (b)  Reserves, resources, and occurrences of uranium are based on a once-through fuel cycle operation. Closed fuel cycles and breeding technology would increase the uranium 
reserve and resource dimensions 50–60 fold. Thorium-based fuel cycles would enlarge the ﬁ ssile-resource base further. 
 (c)  Unconvential uranium occurrences include uranium dissolved in seawater 
Source:  Chapter 7 . 
long-term resource availability. In essence, sufficient long-term supply 
is a function of investment in research and development (exploration 
and new production methods) and in extraction capacity, with demand 
prospects and competitive markets as the principal drivers. 
 For renewable energy sources, the concepts of reserves, resources, and 
occurrences need to be modified, as renewables represent (in principle) 
annual energy flows that, if harvested without disturbing nature’s equi-
libria, are available sustainably and indefinitely. In this context, the total 
natural flows of solar, wind, hydro, geothermal energy, and grown bio-
mass are referred to as  theoretical potentials and are analogous to fos-
sil occurrences. For resources, the concept of  technical potentials is used 
as a proxy. The distinction between technical and theoretical potentials 
thus reflects the possible degree of use determined by thermodynamic, 
geographical, technological, or social limitations without consideration of 
economic feasibility. 
 Economic potentials then correspond to reserves – i.e., the portion of 
the technical potential that could be used cost-effectively with current 
technology and costs of production. Future innovation and technology 
change expand the techno-economic frontier further into the previ-
ously technical potential. For renewables, the technical and economic 
resource potentials are defined by the techno-economic performance 
characteristics, social acceptance, and environmental compatibility of 
the respective conversion technology – for instance, solar panels or 
wind converters. Like hydrocarbon reserves and resources, economic 
and technical renewable potentials are dynamically moving targets in 
response to market conditions, demand, availability of technology, and 
overall performance. Conversion technologies, however, are not consid-
ered in this discussion on resources. Consequently, no reserve equivalent 
(or economic potential) is given here for renewable resources. Rather, 
the deployment ranges resulting from the GEA pathways analyses (see 
 Chapter 17 ) are compared with their annual flows. 
 1.5.2  Fossil and Fissile Resources 
 Occurrences of hydrocarbons and fissile materials in the earth’s crust 
are plentiful – yet they are finite. The extent of the ultimately recov-
erable oil, natural gas, coal, or uranium has been subject to numerous 
reviews, and still there is a large range in the literature – a range 
that sustains continued debate and controversy. The large range is 
the result of varying boundaries of what is included in the analysis of 
a finite stock of an exhaustible resource – for example, conventional 
oil only, or conventional oil plus unconventional occurrences such as 
oil shale, tar sands, and extra heavy oils. Likewise, uranium resources 
are a function of the level of uranium ore concentrations in the source 
rocks considered technically and economically extractable over the 
long run. 
 Table 1.3 summarizes the global fossil and fissile reserves, resources, 
and occurrences identified in the GEA and contrasts these with the 
cumulative resource use (2005–2100) in the GEA pathways. 
 At the low end, cumulative global oil production in GEA pathways 
amounts to little more than total historical oil production up to 2005 – a 
sign of oil approaching peak production but also of a continued future 
for the oil industry. At the high end, future cumulative oil production 
is about 60% higher than past production without tapping unconven-
tional oil in significant quantities. 
 1.5.3  Renewable Resources 
 Renewable energy resources represent the annual energy flows avail-
able through sustainable harvesting on an indefinite basis. While their 
annual flows far exceed global energy needs, the challenge lies in 
developing adequate technologies to manage the often low or varying 
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 29  Wind, biomass, hydro, and ocean energy are all driven by the solar energy inﬂ ux. 
Their numbers are, therefore, not additive to the solar numbers discussed above. 
 30  Exceptions are geothermal energy and urban (municipal) wastes, which are charac-
terized by high energy density. 
 Table 1.4 |  Renewable energy ﬂ ows, potential, and utilization in EJ of energy inputs provided by nature.  
Primary Energy Equivalent in 2005 Utilization GEA pathways Technical potential Annual flows
[EJ] [EJ/yr] [EJ/yr] [EJ/yr]
Biomass, MSW, etc. 46 125–220 160–270 2200
Geothermal 1 1–22 810–1545 1500
Hydro 30 27–39 50–60 200
Solar < 1 150–1500 62,000–280,000 3,900,000
Wind 1 41–715 1250–2250 110,000
Ocean – – 3240–10,500 1,000,000
 Note: The data are energy-input data, not output. Considering technology-speciﬁ c conversion factors greatly reduces the output potentials. For example, the technical potential of 
some 3000 EJ/yr of ocean energy in ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC) would result in an electricity output of about 100 EJ/yr. 
Source:  Chapter 7 (see also  Chapter 11 and IPCC, 2011 for a discussion of renewable resource inventories and their differences). Note: MSW = municipal (and other) solid wastes. 
energy densities and supply intermittencies, and to convert them into 
usable fuels (see  Section 1.5.4 below). Except for biomass, technologies 
harvesting renewable energy flows convert resource flows directly into 
electricity or heat. Their technical potentials are limited by factors such 
as geographical orientation, terrain, or proximity of water, while the eco-
nomic potentials are a direct function of the performance characteristics 
of their conversion technologies within a specific local market setting. 
 Annual renewable energy flows are abundant and exceed even the 
highest future demand scenarios by orders of magnitude. The influx 
of solar radiation reaching the Earth’s surface amounts to 3.9 million 
EJ/yr. Accounting for cloud coverage and empirical irradiance data, the 
local availability of solar energy reduces to 630,000 EJ. Deducting areas 
with harsh or unsuitable terrain leads to a technical potential ranging 
between 62,000 EJ/yr and 280,000 EJ/yr. By 2100 the GEA pathways, 
presented in  Chapter 17 , utilize up to 1500 EJ/yr of solar radiation (see 
 Table 1.4 ). Note: The flows, potential, and utilization rates in  Table 1.4 
are given in terms of energy input – not as outputs (secondary energy 
or using any accounting scheme for equivalent primary energy – see 
 Appendix 1.A ). The production and utilization data, therefore, differ 
from the presentation in  Chapter 17 . 
 The energy carried by wind flows around the globe is estimated at about 
110,000 EJ/yr, 29 of which some 1550 EJ/yr to 2250 EJ/yr are suitable 
for the generation of mechanical energy. The GEA pathways range of 
wind utilization varies between 41 EJ/yr and 715 EJ/yr. The energy in 
the water cycle amounts to more than 500,000 EJ/yr, of which 200 EJ/yr 
could theoretically be harnessed for hydroelectricity. The GEA pathways 
utilize between 27 EJ/yr and 39 EJ/yr compared to a technical potential 
estimated at 53 EJ/yr to 57 EJ/yr. 
 Net primary biomass production is approximately 2400 EJ/yr, which, 
after deducting the needs for food and feed, leaves in theory some 1330 
EJ/yr for energy purposes. Accounting for constraints such as water 
availability, biodiversity, and other sustainability considerations, the 
technical bioenergy potential reduces to 160 EJ/yr to 270 EJ/yr, of which 
between 125 EJ/yr and 220 EJ/yr are utilized in the GEA pathways. The 
global geothermal energy stored in the Earth’s crust up to a depth of 
5000 meters is estimated at 140,000 EJ. The annual rate of heat flow to 
the Earth’s surface is about 1500 EJ/yr, with an estimated potential rate 
of utilization of up to 1000 EJ/yr. 
 Oceans are the largest solar energy collectors on Earth, absorbing on 
average some 1 million EJ/yr. These gigantic annual energy flows are 
of theoretical value only, and the amounts that can be technically and 
economically utilized are significantly lower. 
 1.5.4  Energy Densities 
 The concept of energy density refers to the amount of energy generated 
or used per unit of land. The customary unit for energy densities is Watts 
per square meter (W/m 2 ), referring to a continuous (average) availabil-
ity of the power of one Watt over a year. Typical energy densities for 
demand as well as supply are illustrated in  Figure 1.17 . 
 Energy demand and supply densities have co-evolved since the onset of 
the Industrial Revolution. In fact, one of the advantages of fossil fuels in 
the industrialization process has been their high energy density, which 
enables energy to be produced, transported, and stored with relative ease, 
even in locations with extremely high concentration of energy demand, 
such as industrial centers and rapidly growing urban areas. The mismatch 
between energy demand and supply densities is largest between urban 
energy use, which is highly concentrated, and renewable energies, which 
are characterized by vast, but highly diffuse energy flows. 30 The density 
of energy demand in urban areas is typically between 10 W/m 2 and 100 
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 Figure 1.17 |  Energy densities of fossil (grey) and renewable (green) energy supply 
and demand (red). Source: modiﬁ ed and adapted from Smil,  1991 . 
 31  Renewables are dominated by traditional biomass use that is harvested and used 
locally without international trade. Modern renewables such as hydropower, solar, or 
wind, or for that matter also nuclear power, enter the energy system as secondary 
energy carriers (predominantly electricity, with some direct heat), which are gener-
ally not traded internationally. International trade in biofuels remains comparatively 
modest at some 0.2 EJ in 2005. International trade in electricity is also small: slightly 
above 2 EJ in 2005. 
W/m 2 and can reach some 1000 W/m 2 in extreme locations, such as sky-
scraper complexes and high-density business districts (see  Figure 1.17 
for an illustration of Tokyo’s 23 wards [districts]). Conversely, renewable 
energies have typical energy supply densities of a few W/m 2 under ideal 
conditions (assuming all land can be devoted to harnessing renewable 
energy flows). Under practical conditions (considering competing land-
uses for agriculture and human settlements) renewable energies can 
yield typically between 0.1 W/m 2 and 0.5 W/m 2 (see  Chapter 18 ). As a 
result, locally harvested renewable energies in densely populated areas 
such as cities can only provide a very small fraction (some one percent) 
of urban energy demand. Therefore, renewable energies also have to be 
harvested in locations where land and favorable renewable resource 
potentials are available, and need then to be transported over longer 
distances to urban centers with their high energy demand densities. 
 1.6  Production, Trade, and Conversions 
 1.6.1  Introduction 
 The energy system consists of an intricate web of energy conversion 
processes linking primary energy resources to the provision of energy 
services. A first overview of energy conversion, therefore, can be gained 
by looking at the associated energy flows (see  Figure 1.5 above). Due to 
the associated conversion losses, the energy flows get larger the further 
upstream the energy system one moves, which is the reason why global 
primary energy flows (496 EJ) are about three times larger than useful 
energy flows (169 EJ). 
 As the geographical location of energy resources and “downstream” 
components of the energy system are distributed very unevenly, this 
section begins by describing major global primary energy flows from 
production, use, and trade of energy. 
 1.6.2  Production, Use, and Trade 
 The sheer size of global energy flows, that dwarf energy storage cap-
acities, implies a fundamental energy market identity: production of 
energy flows needs to equal demand, and vice versa. As energy demand 
and production capacities are distributed unevenly geographically, this 
basic market identity translates into vast flows of  energy trade . Energy 
is traded in three forms:
 direct energy flows of  primary energy (coal, crude oil, and natural 
gas) and  secondary energy (primarily refined oil products); and 
 indirect (embodied) energy flows, in which energy is traded in the 
form of (energy-intensive) commodities (aluminum, steel, etc.) and 
products (fertilizer, steel rails, cars, etc.). 
 The following sections summarize the status of primary energy pro-
duction, trade, and  use (defined as “Total Primary Energy Supply” – or 
TPES – in energy balances) for fossil fuels, as they are the dominant form 
of current global energy trade flows. 31 
 1.6.2.1   Direct Energy 
 Table 1.5 summarizes primary energy production, trade, and use for 
nine regions and the world in 2005. From the TPES of some 390 EJ of 
fossil fuels in 2005, some 230 EJ (or close to 60%) are represented by 
energy imports. The share of traded energy (direct primary and second-
ary energy trade) in TPES is markedly different for different fuels: it is 
lowest for coal (18%), followed by natural gas (30%), and reaches 80% 
for crude oil. Including trade in refined oil products (secondary energy), 
oil-related energy trade flows (172 EJ) actually exceed the global TPES 
of oil products (167 EJ). This apparent paradox results from the fact that 
large importers of crude oil have corresponding large refining capaci-
ties, becoming in turn large exporters of refined petroleum products. The 
international division of labor in energy means that a barrel of crude 
oil can be traded various times and in various forms across national 
boundaries (not to mention the multiple “virtual” trades of the same 
barrel on speculative and futures markets). A good (even if extreme) 
illustration is provided in the case of Singapore: total fossil fuel imports 
equal a staggering 880 GJ/capita, of which 210 GJ/capita are used as 
primary energy input to the Singapore economy (with 120 GJ/capita 
final energy use), 450 GJ/capita are re-exported as oil products, and 
an additional 220 GJ/capita exported as bunker fuels for international 
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 Table 1.5 |  World trade ﬂ ows between regions (in EJ) for 2005.  
Coal Crude Oil Oil Products Natural Gas
Prod. Exp. Imp.
Stock 
Changes
Prod. Exp. Imp.
Stock 
Changes
Prod. Exp. Imp.
Stock 
Changes
Prod. Exp. Imp.
Stock 
Changes
 Asia w/o 
China 
14.4 −3.9 5.5 −0.2 7.6 −3.1 17.5 0.1 0.0 −6.9 6.8 0.1 9.4 −3.1 2.3 0.0
 China 48.0 −2.3 0.9 −0.7 7.6 −0.3 5.3 0.0 0.0 −0.8 2.4 0.0 1.8 −0.1 0.1 0.0
 EU27 8.5 −1.2 6.4 −0.1 5.4 −3.0 26.7 0.0 0.1 −11.9 13.2 −0.3 7.9 −2.5 13.3 0.0
 Japan 0.0 0.0 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.0 0.0 0.0 −0.4 2.2 −0.1 0.1 0.0 2.8 0.0
 LAC 2.2 −1.7 0.8 0.0 23.6 −11.0 3.0 0.0 0.2 −4.3 3.0 0.0 6.2 −1.1 1.0 0.0
 MAF 6.0 −2.0 0.6 0.0 72.3 −52.1 2.6 0.0 0.0 −8.4 3.7 0.0 17.1 −5.5 0.4 0.0
 rest-OECD 11.0 −7.5 1.0 0.1 12.2 −8.7 4.2 −0.1 0.8 −2.2 2.2 0.0 11.2 −7.1 1.4 0.3
 REF w/o EU 10.3 −2.9 0.9 −0.1 24.1 −13.6 2.0 0.0 0.0 −4.9 0.5 0.0 27.7 −9.7 4.0 −0.1
 USA 23.9 −1.2 0.8 0.1 13.3 −0.2 23.7 −0.2 0.2 −2.3 6.3 0.0 17.6 −0.7 4.2 0.1
 World trade 
between 
regions 
124.3 −22.8 21.7 −1.0 166.3 −92.1 94.0 −0.2 1.2 −42.0 40.3 −0.2 99.1 −29.8 29.5 0.2
 World trade 
between 
countries 
(IEA data) 
121.8 −21.6 21.8 0.1 167.8 −133.8 133.9 −0.5 – −40.7 37.6 – 99.3 −30.0 29.4 0.3
 Note: The ﬁ ve GEA regions have been expanded to nine to better represent international trade ﬂ ows. These nine regions represent well the major international energy trade ﬂ ows 
obtained from aggregating inter-country trade ﬂ ows based on IEA statistics. Only for crude oil, the inter-regional trade ﬂ ows cover only 70% of the true international trade in crude 
oil (the difference is intra-regional trade – e.g., within the EU27 countries, or within Latin America (LAC) countries. 
Source: data from IEA,  2007a and  2007b . 
shipping and aviation (Schulz,  2010 ). In addition, Singapore’s energy 
trade is also characterized by vast energy flows embodied in exported 
products (petrochemicals) as well as in goods imported into this city 
state (see the discussion below). 
 The largest annual international trade flows (from aggregate country 
imports or exports) in 2005 were crude oil, with some 135 EJ, followed 
by oil products (40 EJ), natural gas (30 EJ), and coal (20 EJ). 
 In terms of regions, the largest 32 exporters for crude oil were the Middle 
East (MEA) region (some 50 EJ), the former Soviet Union (14 EJ), and 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC – 11 EJ), balanced from the oil 
import side with imports to Europe (27 EJ), the United States (24 EJ), and 
developing economies in Asia, excluding China, with 18 EJ. For gas trade, 
only exports from the former Soviet Union (10 EJ) and imports to Europe 
(13 EJ) are beyond the 10 EJ reporting threshold level adopted here. 
Inter-regional coal trade is comparatively small (with largest regional 
exports and imports of 8 EJ (Australia) and Europe (6 EJ), respectively). 
 Perhaps the least known aspect of international energy trade is the sig-
nificant exports and imports of petroleum products. Europe, while a main 
crude oil importer (27 EJ), nonetheless exports 11 EJ of oil products, in 
order to import in turn a further 13 EJ of oil products. The trade in oil 
products to/from other regions is much smaller. The picture emerging 
from the international energy trade is thus less one of directed “source–
sink” energy resource flows, but rather one of an increasingly complex 
“foodweb” in which energy is traded in primary and secondary forms 
across multiple boundaries. 
 1.6.2.2   Embodied Energy 
 The literature and statistical basis of embodied energy flows is thin, as 
existing studies almost invariably focus on embodied CO 2 emissions in 
international trade, without disclosing the underlying energy data. Notable 
exceptions are studies on embodied energy in the international trade of 
Brazil (Machado,  2000 ), China (Liu et al.,  2010 ), and Singapore (Schulz, 
 2010 ). Current energy accounting and balances report direct energy 
flows, whereas  embodied energy trade is quite under-researched and not 
reported systematically. 
 The only data source available for estimating embodied energy flows is 
the GTAP7 (Narayanan et al.,  2008 ) database that contains data suit-
able for estimating the fossil fuel energy embodied in international 
trade flows by input-output analysis ( Table 1.6 ). Important limitations 
and intricate methodological issues need to be considered when trying 
to estimate the energy embodied in internationally traded commodities 
 32  Flows below 10 EJ are not discussed separately. Details are given in  Table 1.5 . All 
data refer to the year 2005. 
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and products based on multi-regional input-output tables. The flows 
summarized in  Table 1.6 , therefore, need to be considered as order of 
magnitude estimates that await further analytical and empirical refine-
ments. Nonetheless, even these “rough” data help to get a sense of pro-
portion. GTAP estimates that (fossil) energy embodied in international 
trade amounts to some 100 EJ – i.e., some 20% of global primary energy 
use – compared to direct energy trade flows of some 190 EJ in 2005 
when using the same regional aggregation 33 as reported in  Table 1.6 . 
 In other words, at least half of global primary energy use is traded among 
regions in either direct or indirect (embodied) form, which illustrates the 
multitude of interdependencies at play in the global energy system that 
go far beyond traditional concerns of oil import dependency. Assuming 
that the relative proportions of intra-regional to international trade 
flows hold for embodied energy flows in a similar way, as in the case of 
direct energy trade flows, then direct and embodied energy trade flows 
(of perhaps 400 EJ) approach the level of world primary energy use in 
the year 2005 (500 EJ). Evidently, these numbers must not be interpreted 
through the traditional lens of (additive) “net” energy trade flows. The 
nature of the international division of labor is precisely that a Joule of 
energy can be traded many times, hence the trade numbers discussed 
above include multiple double-counting. Consider two examples: Iran is 
a major oil producer and exporter but lacks sufficient domestic refining 
capacity. A barrel of oil exported to Singapore may be re-exported back 
to Iran in the form of gasoline, or it may be re-exported back in the form 
of plastic or chemical products. The same physical energy thus ends up 
being counted twice as an international energy trade flow. China is a 
major steel producer, Australia a major exporter of metallurgical coal 
(used in the steel industry), and Germany a major car manufacturer. In 
our example, coal is exported from Australia to China, where it serves to 
produce steel, and this steel is exported from China to Germany, where 
manufacturers use it to produce German cars for export to China. Direct 
energy trade (coal) becomes embodied energy trade (steel), which in 
turn becomes embodied energy trade again (cars), with a physical Joule 
energy counted three times as international energy trade. This example 
also illustrates the great difficulties in comprehensive accounting of 
energy (or GHG emission flows) through multiple exchanges and trade 
flows. Who ultimately “owns” the corresponding energy or GHG “foot-
print”: the Australian coal producer, the Chinese steel manufacturer, the 
German car company, or the Chinese consumer (car buyer)? 
 1.6.2.3   Energy Trade Flows 
 Figure 1.18 summarizes all direct (primary and secondary) and indir-
ect fossil fuel-related international trade flows in the form of a map 
to demonstrate the high degree of energy interdependence world-
wide. The term interdependence suggests that the energy system is 
much more integrated than conventional wisdom or energy security 
concerns would suggest. Not only do many countries critically depend 
on oil exports from the Middle East, the Middle East also depends on 
numerous other countries for its supply of food, consumer products, 
and investment goods that all embody (part of) the region’s previous 
energy exports. 
 1.6.3  Conversions 
 1.6.3.1  Introduction and Overview 
 One way of looking at energy conversion processes is to consider the 
associated energy conversion capacity, which is a proxy of the aggre-
gated size of energy conversion technologies and hence an indicator of 
 33  The difference between the 190 EJ intra-regional trade (nine regions) and the 230 
EJ reported as international energy trade reﬂ ects the energy trade between coun-
tries within a given region (e.g., between Germany and France in the EU region, 
or between Indonesia and Bangladesh in the Asia-sans-China region) which is not 
counted in the regional trade ﬂ ows but included in the global total trade numbers 
(summed from national statistics). 
 Table 1.6 |  Trade in embodied energy between major regions (in EJ, only fossil primary energy) as derived from the GTAP7 Multi-Regional Input-Output Tables for 2005.  
EU US Japan REF
Rest-
OECD
Asia w/o 
China
China LAC Africa
 Sum of 
Exports 
EU 3.5 0.6 1.1 2.2 2.1 0.9 0.8 1.2  12.4 
US 3.3 0.9 0.1 2.8 1.5 0.9 2.8 0.3  12.6 
Japan 0.7 0.9 0 0.2 1.2 1.2 0.1 0.1  4.4 
REF 6.1 1.3 0.3 1.1 1.5 1 0.4 0.3  12 
Rest-OECD 2.4 4.1 0.4 0.2 1 0.5 0.2 0.2  9 
Asia w/o China 5.1 3.6 3.5 0.3 1.3 4.9 0.7 1.1  20.5 
China 5.1 5.4 3 0.4 1.3 4.8 1 0.5  21.5 
LAC 1.4 4.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.2  7.3 
Africa 2.4 0.9 0.2 0 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.2  4.9 
 Sum of imports  26.5  23.8  9.1  2.2  9.6  13.2  10.1  6.2  3.9  104.6 
Source: Narayanan et al.,  2008 .
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the magnitude of technological change and capital replacement required 
for improving energy efficiency through the application of more efficient 
processes and technologies. Unlike the picture that emerges when look-
ing at energy flows, the scale of energy conversion technologies por-
trays a different pattern in which energy end-use conversions dominate. 
Although global numbers are not available, this pattern of an increasing 
scale of energy conversion processes and devices revealed by the long-
term history of the US energy system ( Table 1.7 ) is quite characteristic 
of the global picture as well. 
 For instance, in 2000 the total installed capacity of all US energy con-
version devices equaled a staggering 35 TW (that compares to a global 
energy flow of some 16 TW-yr). 34 Energy supply-related conversion proc-
esses account for some 5 TW, with 30 TW in energy end-use, most notably 
in the form of automobiles (25 TW). Assuming all cars ran on zero-emis-
sion hydrogen fuel cells, the installed capacity of the existing car fleet 
would be about ten times larger than that of all electricity-generating 
power plants and could easily substitute the traditional utility-dominated 
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 34  In other words, if all US energy conversion devices operated 24 hours a day, 7 days 
a week, they would transform energy ﬂ ows twice as large as the entire world energy 
use. The fact that US primary energy of 100 EJ is equal to 20% of global primary 
energy use illustrates the comparatively low aggregate capacity utilization of energy 
conversion devices, particularly in energy end use. (Transportation surveys suggest, 
for instance, that on average a car is used only one hour per day). 
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centralized electricity-generation model by an entirely decentralized gen-
eration system, powered by cars during their ample idle times. Such drastic 
transformations in electricity generation have been proposed (e.g., Lovins 
et al.,  1996 ), especially as a means of accommodating vastly increased 
contributions from intermittent renewables such as wind, solar thermal, 
or photovoltaic systems without the need for centralized energy storage. 
Even if currently futuristic, such daring visions of technology are a useful 
reminder that the analysis of energy systems needs to look beyond energy 
flows only and to always consider both major components of energy sys-
tems: energy supply  and energy end-use. 
 1.6.3.2   Electricity Generation 
 Electricity is growing faster as a share of energy end-uses than other 
direct-combustion uses of fuels. Between 1971 and 2008, world elec-
tricity production almost quadrupled from 19 EJ to 73 EJ of secondary 
energy (see  Figure 1.19 below) – an absolute increase of 54 EJ. Some 
60% of this growth (32 EJ) was in countries outside the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
 Figure 1.19 depicts the fuel share in global electricity production. About 
68% of global electricity is generated from the combustion of fossil 
fuels, with coal accounting for more than 40% of total production. The 
share of oil in power production has decreased considerably from 23% 
to 6% since the first oil crisis in 1973. On the other hand, the share of 
natural gas has increased from 12% to 21%. Renewable energy sources 
contribute about 18%, with hydropower accounting for more than 85% 
of this. Following a rapid expansion in the 1970s and 1980s, nuclear 
electricity generation has seen little growth since. 
 Figure 1.19 also shows electricity production for the GEA regions for 
the base year 2005. Fuel mixes vary widely, primarily reflecting the 
 Table 1.7 |  Installed capacity of energy conversion technologies (in GW) for the 
United States, 1850 to 2000.  
GW (rounded) 1850 1900 1950 2000
stationary 
end-use
thermal (furnaces/
boilers)
300 900 1900 2700
mechanical (prime 
movers)
1 10 70 300
electrical (drives, 
appliances)
0 20 200 2200
mobile 
end-use
animals/ships/trains/
aircraft
5 30 120 260
automobiles 0 0 3300 25,000
stationary 
supply
thermal (power plant 
boilers)
0 10 260 2600
mechanical (prime 
movers)
0 3 70 800
chemical (reﬁ neries) 0 8 520 1280
 TOTAL  306  981  6440  35,140 
Source:  Chapter 24 case studies,  Appendix 24.B .
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availability of local energy resources and to some extent also reflecting 
past technical and financial capacity to invest in advanced technologies 
such as nuclear. Coal for electricity generation is most prominent in Asia, 
accounting for almost 70% of production. OECD and Africa also have 
significant shares of coal-based power generation. Nuclear energy is 
primarily used in OECD countries as well as in Eastern Europe and the 
countries of the former Soviet Union. It makes only a minor contribu-
tion in developing countries, except China, which currently has the most 
nuclear power under construction in the world. Hydropower is unevenly 
used, providing 66% of electricity in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Non-hydro renewable energy in electricity production is low in all 
regions. However, as a result of various policy support mechanisms in a 
rapidly increasing number of countries (see  Chapter 11 ), about half of 
current investments in power generation are in renewable generation. 
 Figure 1.20 shows regional trends in electricity output: growth trends 
are across heterogeneous regions. Most additional electricity produc-
tion since 1971 was actually in the OECD countries (+22 EJ), slightly 
larger than in the Asia region 35 (+20 EJ/yr). More recent growth trends, 
however, change this picture dramatically. Since 1990, growth in elec-
tricity generation has focused heavily on Asia (most notably in China, 
an additional 16 EJ of electricity generated), followed by the OECD 
 35  For the deﬁ nition of GEA regions, see  Appendix 1.B . 
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 Table 1.8 |  Global GHG and pollutant emissions by source for the year 2005.  
Pollutant Emissions Main Greenhouse Gases
Sulfur NOx BC OC CO VOC PM2.5 CO 2 CH 4 N 2 O
TgSO 2 TgNO 2 Tg Tg Tg Tg Tg PgCO 2 Tg Tg
 Energy & Industry  110.0  106.5  5.1  12.2  561.0  131.1  34.6  26.5  105.2  - 
 international shipping 13.1 18.8 0.1 0.1 1.3 3.1 - - 0.5 -
 transport 3.4 34.6 1.2 1.3 162.0 28.5 2.9 - 1.0 -
 industry 27.0 17.2 1.6 2.3 115.3 31.8 13.2 - 0.9 -
 residential & commercial 8.8 9.6 2.1 8.2 261.3 38.6 15.7 - 14.3 -
 energy Conversion 57.7 26.3 0.1 0.3 21.1 29.1 2.8 - 88.5 -
 Non-Energy  4.1  20.8  1.6  23.6  475.3  81.8  32.2  6.8  233.4  - 
 agriculture (animals, rice, soil) - 2.3 - - - 0.8 - - 134.4 -
  waste (landﬁ lls, wastewater, 
incineration)
0.1 0.3 - - 4.1 1.5 - - 72.6 -
  waste (agricultural burning 
on ﬁ eld)
0.2 0.6 0.1 0.7 19.9 2.7 - - 1.5 -
 savannah burning 1.6 11.6 1.5 10.9 222.0 35.1 - - 8.9 -
 forest ﬁ res 2.2 6.0 - 12 229.3 41.7 - - 16.0 -
 TOTAL  114.1  127.3  6.7  35.8  1036.3  212.9  66.8  33.3  338.6  12.1 
Sources: data from Lamarque et al.,  2010 ; Smith et al.,  2011 ; IPCC-RCP database 38 Houghton,  2008 ; GEA  Chapter 17 .
 36  Thus, on average, each premature death is associated with close to 20 life-years lost. 
Estimates for the health impact of outdoor air pollution suggest close to 3 million 
pre-mature deaths/year and some 23 million DALYS. The health impacts of indoor 
and outdoor air pollution are not additive. See  Chapters 4 and  17 for a more detailed 
discussion. Note: DALYS: “Disability-adjusted Life Years are units for measuring the 
global burden of disease and the effectiveness of health interventions and changes 
in living conditions. DALYs are calculated as the present value of future years of 
disability-free life that are lost as a result of premature death or disability occurring 
in a particular year. DALY is a summary measure of population health and includes 
two components, years of life lost due to premature mortality and years lost due to 
disability” (WHO,  2011 ). 
(+9 EJ) and all other developing countries combined (6 EJ). The REF 
region even experienced a slight drop in electricity output in the after-
math of its economic restructuring. 
 1.7  Environmental Impacts (Emissions) 
 1.7.1  Introduction 
 Energy extraction, conversion, and use are major contributors to GHG 
emissions and thus global warming. In addition, a host of energy-linked 
pollutant emissions, including suspended fine particles and precursors of 
acid deposition, contribute to local and regional air pollution and ecosys-
tem degradation. Energy-related pollutants also result in adverse effects 
for human health. The largest single source of health impacts of energy is 
associated with indoor air pollution resulting from the use of traditional 
biomass in open fires or inefficient cooking stoves by poor people in 
developing countries. Its human health impacts are estimated to result in 
about 2 million premature deaths, or about 42 million person-years of life 
(DALYs 36 ) lost per year, due to respiratory and other diseases, affecting 
particularly women and children, making access to culturally acceptable, 
clean, and efficient cooking fuels a priority policy concern. 
 Table 1.8 summarizes the major sources of global GHGs and selected 37 
pollutant emissions. The main pollutants emitted in the combustion of 
fossil fuels are sulfur and nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, and black 
and organic carbon, including suspended particulate matter. In addition, 
fossil fuel combustion in the energy sector produces more CO 2 than any 
other human activity, and contributes to about 30% of global methane 
(CH 4 ) emissions. Altogether, the energy sector is thus the biggest source 
of anthropogenic GHG emissions that are changing the composition of 
the atmosphere. 
 1.7.2  CO 2 and other GHGs 
 CO 2 emissions from fossil energy use in 2005 are estimated at 7.2 Pg C 
or 26.4 Pg CO 2 (Boden et al.,  2010 ). This represents 80% of all anthropo-
genic sources of CO 2 in that year, with the remainder associated with 
land-use changes (deforestation) (Houghton,  2008 ). 
 37  Only emissions of pollutants where energy plays an important role are highlighted 
here. As such,  Chapter 1 does not suggest that other pollutants and emissions 
sources are not important, but rather that their assessment is beyond the scope of 
this energy focused précis. 
 38  See www.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/tnt/RcpDb. 
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 Figure 1.21 |  Development of annual energy-related (a) CO 2 and (b) CH 4 emissions by region (compared to global non-energy sources) from 1900 to 2005 in Pg (Gt)(CO 2 ) and 
Tg (CH 4 ). Source: data from Boden et al.,  2010 ; Houghton,  2008 ; IPCC-RCP database. 39 
 39  See www.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/tnt/RcpDb. 
 Figure 1.21 shows the historical development of fossil energy CO 2 emis-
sions by major world regions (compared to global non-energy-related 
sources of CO 2 ). Today’s industrialized countries contribute most to the 
present global CO 2 emissions and have also emitted most of the histor-
ical emissions associated with the observed increase in atmospheric CO 2 
concentrations. Although they are presently at lower absolute levels, 
emissions are growing more rapidly in developing countries. The largest 
source of energy-related carbon emissions are coal and oil (including 
oil products for feedstocks), with each about a 40% share, followed by 
natural gas, which represents about 20% of carbon emissions from the 
energy sector. 
 CH 4 is the second largest GHG contributing to anthropogenic global 
warming. Energy-related sources include coal production (where it is a 
major safety hazard), oil production (from associated natural gas), and 
natural gas production, transport, and distribution (leaks). Municipal 
solid waste, animal manure, rice cultivation, wastewater, and crop resi-
due burning are the major non-energy-related sources of CH 4 emissions. 
While CH 4 emissions from energy accounted for only 30% of total CH 4 
emissions in 2005, the relative share of the energy sector has been con-
tinuously increasing due to the rise of fossil fuel use throughout the 
20th century (see  Figure 1.21 ). 
 Other GHGs include nitrous oxide (N 2 O), tetrafluoromethane (CF 4 ), sulfur 
hexafluoride (SF 6 ), and different types of ozone-depleting hydro-fluoro-
carbons (HFCs). These gases are predominantly emitted from non-energy 
sectors. N 2 O is the largest contributor to global warming among these 
other GHGs (IPCC,  2001 ). Important sources of N 2 O include agricultural 
soil, animal manure, sewage, industry, automobiles, and biomass burn-
ing, with energy contributing about 5% to total N 2 O emissions. CF 4 , SF 6 , 
and HFCs are predominantly emitted by various industrial sources, with 
only minor contributions from the energy sector (and are, therefore, not 
reported separately here). 
 1.7.3  Traditional Pollutants (SO x , NO x , Particulates, etc.) 
 Energy-related air pollution is responsible for a number of health 
effects including increased mortality and morbidity from cardio-respi-
ratory diseases (Brunekreef and Holgate,  2002 ). Developing countries 
in particular face the greatest burden of impacts from air pollution, 
both outdoor and indoor. They tend to have high long-term levels of 
exposure from pollution sources such as forest fires, biomass burning, 
coal-fired power plants, vehicles, and industrial facilities, thus implying 
relatively high health impacts. In addition, indoor air pollution due to 
the lack of access to clean cooking fuels adds to exposure to air pol-
lution, particularly in large parts of Asia and Africa. According to the 
 World Health Report 2002 , indoor air pollution is the second largest 
environmental contributor to ill health, behind unsafe water and sani-
tation (WHO,  2002 ). 
 Figure 1.22 shows the historical development of selected pollutant emis-
sions by major world regions (compared to global non-energy-related 
sources). It builds upon the collaboration of major inventory experts 
(Lamarque et al.,  2010 ; Smith et al.,  2011 ). 
 Unfortunately for some important pollutants, such as lead or particulate 
matter, comparable global inventories with historical trends do not exist. 
Information for these pollutants is usually summarized at the regional, 
national, or city level only. Below, the trends for various pollutants are 
summarized, starting with those that are dominated by emissions from 
the energy sector. 
 Anthropogenic  sulfur emissions have resulted in greatly increased sul-
fur deposition and atmospheric sulfate loadings and acidic deposition 
in and around most industrialized areas (Smith et al.,  2011 ). High lev-
els of ambient sulfur concentrations impact human health and cause 
corrosion. Sulfuric acid deposition can be detrimental to ecosystems, 
harming aquatic animals and plants, and is also damaging a wide 
range of terrestrial plant life. In addition, sulfur dioxide forms sulfate 
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aerosols that have a significant effect on global and regional climates. 
The effect on global climate change of sulfate aerosols may be second 
only to that caused by CO 2 , albeit in the opposite direction (Forster et 
al.,  2007 ). Stratospheric sulfate aerosols back-scatter incoming solar 
radiation, producing (regional) cooling effects that mask the global 
warming signal from increased atmospheric concentration of GHGs. 
Sulfur is ubiquitous in the biosphere and often occurs in relatively high 
concentrations in fossil fuels, with coal and crude oil deposits com-
monly containing 1–2% sulfur by weight (and much higher in some 
deposits). The widespread combustion of fossil fuels from the energy 
sector has, therefore, greatly increased sulfur emissions into the atmos-
phere, with the anthropogenic component now substantially greater 
than natural emissions on a global basis (Smith et al.,  2001 ;  2011 ). 
More than 90% of present sulfur emissions are released from the 
energy sector. Historically, global emissions peaked in the early 1970s 
due to the tightening of air pollution legislation particularly in industri-
alized countries and were decreasing until 2000. Sulfur emissions have 
resurged since (see  Figure 1.22 ), with increased coal-related emissions 
in China, international shipping (using heavy fuel or “bunker” oil that 
has a particularly high sulfur content), and developing countries in gen-
eral (Smith et al.,  2011 ). 
 Emissions from nitrogen oxides (NO x – predominantly nitrogen 
dioxide and nitric oxide) contribute to a wide variety of health and 
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 Figure 1.22 |  Development of annual energy-related pollutant emissions in Tg: sulfur (SO 2 ), nitrogen oxides (NO x ), black carbon (BC), organic carbon (OC), carbon monoxide 
(CO), and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) by annual region (compared to global non-energy sources) from 1900 to 2005. 
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environmental problems (respiratory diseases such as asthma, emphy-
sema, and bronchitis; heart disease; damage to lung tissue; acid rain). 
NO x is also a main component of ground-level ozone and smog and 
thus contributes to global warming. Similar to sulfur, NO x emissions are 
dominated by the energy sector, which accounts for more than 80% of 
total anthropogenic NO x emissions. Emissions from NO x have continu-
ously been increasing with the use of fossil fuels at the global level. 
Emissions trends differ significantly, however, at the regional level. While 
control measures in industrialized countries have resulted in improved 
air quality and decreasing NO x emissions since the early 1980s, the 
rapid increase in NO x emissions in Asia and from international shipping 
have more than compensated for improvements elsewhere, leading to 
an overall global increase in emissions (see  Figure 1.22 ). 
 The incomplete combustion of carbon-containing fuels (fossil as well as 
biomass) causes emissions of  carbon monoxide and other pollutants, 
including  particulate matter, black carbon, and  organic carbon. 40 In add-
ition, black carbon strongly absorbs solar radiation and is contributing to 
climate warming (although its net aggregated effect is subject to uncer-
tainty), and its deposition is a significant contributor to Arctic ice-melt. 
In 2005, combustion from the energy sector contributed about 75% of 
the total anthropogenic emissions of black carbon, with forest fires and 
savannah burning accounting for the remainder. Due to relatively higher 
emissions coefficients of organic carbon and carbon monoxide from vege-
tation fires, the contribution of the energy sector is between 35% and 50% 
and thus smaller than for black carbon (see  Table 1.8 above). Historically, 
industrialized countries were once the primary source of emissions from 
incomplete combustion. However, emissions of black carbon and organic 
carbon in the industrialized world have been declining since the 1920s, 
as have those of carbon monoxide since the 1980s. Major drivers of this 
trend are improved technology and the introduction of air quality legis-
lation. Today, the majority of energy-related emissions from incomplete 
combustion occur in developing countries (see  Figure 1.22 ), resulting in 
significant health risks, particularly from household combustion of solid 
fuels (mostly biomass) that affect between half and three-quarters of the 
population in most poor countries, particularly in rural areas. 
 Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) are emitted by a variety of sources, 
including industrial processes (solvents), on-road vehicles, refineries, 
vegetation fires, and residential wood burning, as well as emanations 
from a wide array of household products. Total global anthropogenic 
VOC emissions are estimated at about 220 Tg in 2005, with the energy 
and industry sectors accounting for about 60% of the total. VOCs con-
tribute to the formation of ground-level ozone and include a variety 
of chemicals, some of which have short- and long-term adverse health 
 40  Black carbon: pure carbon (soot) emitted (“black smoke”) from the combustion of 
fossil fuels, biofuels and other biomass (vegetation burning). It absorbs sunlight 
and reradiates heat into the atmosphere, thus producing a climate warming effect. 
Organic carbon: carbon combined with oxygen/hydrogen atoms (organic radicals) 
mainly arising from the incomplete combustion (“brown” or “white smoke”) of bio-
mass. Organic carbon aerosols (ﬁ ne particles suspended in the atmosphere) tend to 
back-scatter sunlight, producing a cooling effect on climate. 
effects. As for other pollutants, the energy and industrial emissions 
have been increasing substantially, and in the recent decades the major 
sources of VOCs have moved from the industrialized world to develop-
ing countries, which contribute about 75% of present energy and indus-
trial VOC emissions. 
 1.8  Heterogeneity in Energy Use 
 1.8.1  Introduction 
 In addition to the temporal variations in global energy use described 
in earlier sections, there is a huge degree of cross-sectional hetero-
geneity in energy use evident across the globe today. While aggregate 
energy statistics are insightful for describing the energy system glo-
bally, regionally, or nationally, they often mask the large disparities in 
energy use both across and within national and regional boundaries. 
Heterogeneities are evident both in the quantities of energy used and in 
the structure of use across different nations and sub-populations. These 
disparities stem, for the most part, from differences in incomes or lev-
els of economic affluence, production and consumption activities, and 
lifestyles. Yet a small part of the variations might also be on account of 
differences in climatic conditions and thus energy service needs across 
regions (e.g., heating/cooling). Differences also exist in the types of 
energy carriers that are predominantly used and the levels of access to 
these across countries and populations. 
 1.8.2  Heterogeneity in Energy Use across Nations 
 Akin to the uneven development of economies around the world, energy 
use and service varies significantly across countries. In 2005, the total 
final energy use was about 330 EJ globally, with the average per capita 
final energy use about 50 GJ. However, this global average conceals 
enormous differences in final energy use per capita across nations. The 
starkest disparity in average national final energy use per capita can be 
found by comparing Qatar, the country with the highest average in 2005 
(445 GJ/capita), with Eritrea, that with the lowest (<5 GJ/capita), a diffe-
rence of a factor of about 94. The OECD countries, with less than a sixth 
of the world’s population, account for over 45% of total final energy 
use (see  Figure 1.23 ). Developing countries, with about four-fifths of 
the world’s population, account for just under 40% of this total. OECD 
countries on average consume over 16 times as much energy per capita 
than developing countries in South Asia and Africa. 
 Differences in the amounts of final energy use per capita are mirrored 
in variations in the structure of energy use across nations and regions. 
In general, countries with higher levels of energy use per capita also 
use a larger proportion of their total final energy for transport uses. 
For instance, the OECD countries use over a third of their final energy 
for transport. In contrast, in Africa and Asia, over 40% of final energy 
is for residential and commercial uses. Finally, in addition to variations 
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in the levels and purposes of energy use across nations, countries also 
exhibit very divergent patterns of energy use. Nearly a third of all final 
energy use in developing countries is unprocessed biomass, with this 
fraction being close to 90% for some least-developed countries. In add-
ition, about 30% of the population in developing countries lack access 
to, and so do not use, any electricity. In developed OECD countries, how-
ever, almost all final energy use is in the form of electricity or oil/gas 
products. These differences in patterns have implications for the level of 
energy services across nations, as some carriers like traditional biomass 
used in traditional end-use devices have very low efficiencies, and are 
associated with high emissions, and social externalities. 
 1.8.3  Heterogeneity in Energy Use within Nations 
 Often the variance in energy use within nations can be of the same or 
greater order of magnitude as that across nations. In such instances, 
aggregate national indicators disguise intra-national disparities, some-
times grievously. Within nations, substantial differences in energy use 
exist across geographical regions, rural versus urban residents, and 
among other socio-economic and demographic sub-groups of the popu-
lation. Spatial patterns of economic development and industrial activity 
are reflected in variations in quantities and structures of energy use 
between regions. In many developing countries, one can find evidence 
of a dual economy with substantial disparities in quantities and types 
of energy use between rural hinterlands, with poor infrastructure and 
formal development, and urban metropolitan areas that are the cent-
ers of industrial production and economic activity. Thus, for instance, 
as shown in  Figure 1.24 , the poorest 20% of the rural population in 
India have per capita energy use levels comparable to those estimated 
for the pre-agrarian European population some 10,000 years ago. Even 
the richest 20% of the rural population in India uses only about half as 
much energy per capita as the richest 20% of the urban population, with 
their energy use levels comparable to the estimates for China in 100 B.C. 
Some of this difference in the quantity of energy used can be explained 
by disparities in income levels across rural and urban regions. However, 
large disparities in the structure of energy use are also evident, both in 
terms of uses of energy and the types of energy used. 
 The starkest disparities in energy use within (and between) nations are 
those between rich and poor people. Thus, as  Figure 1.24 illustrates, the 
richest decile of the Dutch population uses almost four times as much 
energy per capita as the poorest decile, which is about the same order 
of difference as between the richest and poorest urban Indian quintiles. 
The richest 20% of urban Indians use only a third as much of the energy 
used by the poorest 10% of the Dutch, albeit the richest 20% in India 
will include many examples of very wealthy individuals whose energy 
use vastly surpasses that of the average Dutch top 10% income class. As 
such, these illustrative numbers reflect the wide disparities in incomes 
and development levels across and within nations. The richest Dutch 
also use almost three times as much energy for food on average as their 
poorest compatriots. This, of course, does not imply that rich people eat 
three times as much as poor people in the Netherlands. However, the 
food habits and types of provisions consumed do differ. For instance, the 
rich Dutch eat more exotic fruits and vegetables (e.g., Kiwi fruit flown in 
from New Zealand) than the poor which explain their much larger food-
related (embodied) energy use. The biggest differences in the structure 
of energy use between rich and poor people, both within and across 
nations, is the substantially larger share of energy used for transport 
and for the consumption of products and services. Poor people, by con-
trast, use the largest proportion of energy for basic necessities such as 
food and household fuels (cooking and hygiene). These differences illus-
trate the substantial variations in lifestyles and growing consumerism 
evident with rising incomes and retail market sophistication. 
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 1.8.4  Disparities in Energy Use 
 While fairness and equity are normative, ethical concepts, several meth-
odologies and metrics exist to measure dispersions and distributions 
which help to describe disparities in energy use. Lorenz curves and Gini 
indices or coefficients are widely used to measure inequalities in income 
and wealth. The Lorenz curve is a graphical representation of a cumu-
lative distribution function, often with a ranked cumulative distribution 
of population on the x-axis versus a ranked distribution of cumulative 
value of a given variable such as income, wealth, or energy on the y-axis. 
A perfectly equal distribution is described by a straight line where y = x 
along the diagonal or along 45 degrees, where every given percentage of 
the population consumes or owns an equal percentage of the variable in 
question (e.g., energy, wealth, etc.). The greater the distance of the Lorenz 
curve from this diagonal, the greater the degree of inequality it represents. 
The Gini coefficient, also used as a measure of inequality, is mathematic-
ally represented as the ratio of the area between a Lorenz curve and the 
diagonal (or line of perfect equality) to the total area under the diagonal. 
The Gini coefficient can range from 0 to 1, with a value closer to 0 repre-
senting a more equal distribution. In addition to Lorenz curves and Gini 
coefficients, other measures of inequality commonly in use are ratios of 
percentiles, deciles, quintiles, or quartiles of the population. 
 Figure 1.25 illustrates inequality across nations by depicting the Lorenz 
curves for important energy and economic variables for the year 2000. 
The x-axis depicts the ranked cumulative distribution of population by 
nation, while the cumulative disposal of income (in PPP terms), final 
energy, and electricity are shown on the y-axis. 
 In terms of income and final energy use, the poorest 40% of the world’s 
population only disposes of some 10% of global income and final energy 
use; the richest third disposes of two-thirds of global income and final 
energy. It is noteworthy that final energy use mirrors prevailing (vast) 
income inequalities closely. Energy and economic poverty and wealth 
thus go hand in hand. Access to electricity is even more inequitable. In 
2005, some 23% of the world’s population (1.4 billion people) had no 
access to electricity at all. 
 1.9  The Costs of Energy 
 1.9.1  Accounting Frameworks and Different Types of Costs 
 In one way or another, energy services carry a price tag. The price a con-
sumer pays for a particular energy service based, for example, on elec-
tricity use is made up by a variety of components, the most important of 
which are generating costs, systems costs, rents, profits, taxes, subsidies, 
and externalities. 
 Generating costs are not only a key component determining the price 
of a service but also a central decision criterion for investment and 
operating decisions alike. Generating costs they consist of three major 
components: capital costs, fuel costs, and non-fuel operating and main-
tenance (O&M) costs. Capital costs are the costs associated with the 
construction/acquisition/purchase of a power plant, refinery, or home 
furnace. Fuel costs are the expenditures associated with the fuel supply 
for plant operation or service provision. O&M costs cover labor costs, 
insurance, consumables other than fuel, repairs, etc. More recently, cap-
ital costs also include decommissioning expenditures at the end of a 
plant’s service life, while O&M costs may include waste disposal costs. 
 While fuel and O&M costs are largely incurred on a per-use basis, capital 
or investment costs occur upfront – for some technologies spread over 
several years of plant construction – before earning revenue or provid-
ing energy services for the investor. Capital costs must be recovered 
over the lifetime of the investment, reflecting the wear and tear of the 
plant (the investment) over its economic lifetime. 
 The levelized cost 41 of electricity (LCOE) is a widely used tool in policy 
analysis for comparing the generating costs of different technologies over 
their economic life. A critical parameter in the LCOE approach is the dis-
count rate, which reflects the interest rate on capital (cost of capital or 
return) for an investor in the absence of specific market or technology 
risks. LCOE spreads the capital costs (including the finance costs) uni-
formly over the lifetime of an investment, accounts for the fuel and O&M 
costs, and calculates the specific costs per unit of energy delivered. 42 
 41  For a review see Anderson,  2007 . For a review quantitative cost estimates for elec-
tricity generation see Heptonstall,  2007 and NREL,  2010 . 
 42  Note: LCOE assumes perfect knowledge about future fuel prices and interest rates 
several decades into the future. Scenarios of different price trajectories are com-
monly used to reﬂ ect uncertainty. 
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 The relative structure of the various generating cost components var-
ies significantly per unit of output for different generating options (see 
 Figure 1.26 and  Table 1.9 , using a real annual discount rate of 5%), 
and the variation indicates the inherent risks associated with a par-
ticular option. For example, gas combined cycle technology (CCGT) 
has the lowest capital costs but the highest fuel costs of the options 
shown in  Figure 1.26 and  Table 1.9 . Consequently, CCGT generating 
costs are almost all fuel costs. Any change in natural gas prices thus 
impacts its generating costs greatly. Conversely, nuclear power gener-
ation is dominated by high capital costs (>70%), with fuel cycle and 
O&M costs assuming approximately equal shares of the remaining 
costs. 43 The high share of capital costs exposes nuclear power projects 
to financial risks associated with rising interest rates and to cost escal-
ation caused by delays in construction completion. Adding carbon 
 43  Unlike natural gas or coal-ﬁ red generation, the fuel cost of nuclear power generation 
is not dominated by the resource (uranium) input price but by enrichment and fuel 
fabrication costs. Uranium accounts for approximately 25% of fuel costs only. 
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 Figure 1.26 |  Structure of total levelized costs of different electricity generation 
technologies (in percent using a 5% discount rate) and representative cost ranges 
for 2030 as used in the GEA pathways (cf.  Chapter 17 ) for capital costs, operation 
and maintenance (O&M), fuel costs, as well as waste disposal costs for nuclear and 
advanced coal with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS). All values are given 
in 2005US$ and are shown in  Table 1.9 . Note: (a) Includes decommissioning costs 
for nuclear power and costs for transport and disposal of 90% of CO 2 emissions for 
advanced coal power plants with carbon capture and storage (CCS). 
 Table 1.9 |  Total levelized costs of different electricity generation technologies (in percent using a 5% discount rate) and representative cost ranges in 2005US$/MWh as 
used in GEA. Note: These are direct energy (electricity generating) costs only, i.e. excluding externality costs; Data source:  Chapters 12 and  17, and IPCC, 2011 . 
Solar PV
 Wind 
 (onshore) 
Nuclear a Advanced coal Adv. coal with CCS Gas combined cycle
Capital $/kWe 900–2800 900–1300 4000–6200 1100–1600 1700–2400 400–500
O&M $/kWe 6–18 19–30 118–180 46–65 69–96 16–20
Fuel $/GJ 0 0 0.7–0.9 1.3–2.8 1.3–2.8 2.6–6.5
Waste $/MWh 0 0 1–2 0 6 0
Total generating costs $/MWh 27–151 21–131 53–100 27–46 44–69 24–49
 (a)  Current (pre-2010) nuclear investment costs under construction in several developing countries range between 1800 and 2500 $/kWe. 
capture and storage (CCS) can also increase costs substantially: typ-
ically adding some 50 $/MWh levelized costs to pulverized coal fired 
power plants (and 20–30 $/MWh for IGCC or natural gas electricity 
generation), see  Chapter 12 . 
 In addition to the generating costs, the price of electricity for consumers 
then includes transmission and distribution (T&D) costs and taxes or 
subsidies. Taxes and subsidies are policy instruments to influence con-
sumer behavior. Taxes can be used to discourage politically undesirable 
behavior patterns, while subsidies provide incentives to adopt a more 
desirable investment or consumption pattern. Subsidized electricity or 
gasoline prices are also an instrument for extending access to energy 
services to low-income families, supporting small rural business devel-
opments, or connecting rural areas to markets. 
 Figure 1.27 compares gasoline prices with and without taxes for a var-
iety of countries. While prices without taxes vary by a factor of two, this 
doubles to a factor of four when taxes are included. The taxes imposed 
by countries reflect national policy objectives, e.g. revenue needs, trade 
balances, etc., and not necessarily the countries’ endowment with oil 
resources. For example, oil-exporting Norway features the second high-
est gasoline taxes in this comparison (equivalent to a carbon tax of 
US$576/tonne of CO 2 ), while oil-importing US has the second lowest 
gasoline taxation (equivalent to US$56/tonne of CO 2 ). Other oil-export-
ing countries such as Kuwait (not shown in  Figure 1.27 ) even subsidize 44 
domestic gasoline use. 
 44  In the most general deﬁ nition, an energy subsidy is represented by the difference 
between (low) local and prevailing (high) world market prices (without taxes). When 
the local gasoline price is below the marginal costs of producing and reﬁ ning crude 
oil, this represents a direct ﬁ nancial transfer/subsidy from energy producers (usually 
nationalized industries – i.e., from the government) to energy consumers (house-
holds, taxi companies). Beyond that, any difference between local and world market 
prices is best conceptualized as opportunity costs associated with foregone potential 
export revenues, and also classiﬁ ed as energy subsidy. The marginal costs of produ-
cing a barrel of crude oil in many oil-exporting countries can be as low as US$5/bbl. 
The difference to a world market price of say US$100/bbl (in economic theory deter-
mined by the global marginal [i.e., highest] production costs plus proﬁ ts) is referred 
to in economics as “scarcity rent,” leading to vast ﬁ nancial transfers and wealth to 
energy producers, which may, however, not always have only beneﬁ cial effects (the 
so-called “resource curse,” Humphreys et al.,  2007 ). 
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 Figure 1.27 |  Gasoline prices with and without taxes in US$/liter and implied price of carbon (US$/tCO 2 ) for 1st quarter of 2010. Source: data from IEA, 2011. 
 Finally there are cost elements caused by the conversion and use of 
energy and energy services which – although real – are not included in 
the price paid by the consumer but paid by society at large. Examples 
of such costs, called “externalities,” are health and environmen-
tal damage costs resulting from air and water pollution from fossil 
fuel combustion or lower property values due to the proximity of a 
nuclear power plant or noise from wind converters. Ignoring exter-
nalities masks the true costs of energy and sends the wrong signal 
to the market place. Charges or taxes on carbon emissions or invest-
ment in carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology are ways to 
internalize externalities caused by GHG emissions. They also change 
the merit order of electricity generation favoring low-GHG emission 
technologies. 
 While investment decisions are guided by LCOE considerations, oper-
ating decisions and dispatch of an existing fleet of power stations are 
based on short-term marginal costs – in essence, fuel costs and possibly 
emission charges. Capital costs are no longer a decision criterion, as 
these are “sunk.” 
 Figure 1.28 explains the inherent substitutability between capital and fuel 
costs using the example of providing heat for cooking. Higher-efficiency 
stoves are more capital-intensive but reduce fuel costs, which in a rural 
developing country context often mean time spent collecting wood for 
fuel. Shifting to more capital-intensive stoves (and higher-exergy fuels) 
reduces the time spent on fuel supply and at the same time improves 
indoor air quality through lower combustion-related emissions. The time 
released from gathering fuel is then available for more productive uses. 
This freed time, lower pollution exposure, and improved human health 
are important examples of positive externalities of moving to cleaner 
household fuels. 
 A transition to an improved cooking service can occur in one of two ways, as 
shown in  Figure 1.28 . A simple shift or substitution to higher-exergy energy 
carriers (e.g., from firewood to liquefied petroleum gas – LPG) will result 
in higher combustion efficiency, lower combustion-related emissions, lower 
time costs associated with fuel collection, but higher capital costs for stoves 
(and cash expenditure for commercial fuels). On the other hand, improve-
ments in cooking services can also be achieved through the use of more 
Chapter 1  Energy Primer
139
capital-intensive improved technologies that continue to use traditional 
fuels (e.g., firewood and residues) but more efficiently (e.g., biogasifiers). 
 Further cost components related to  Figure 1.28 are “inconvenience” or 
“opportunity” costs. Depending on the levelized costs of the heat for 
cooking, it might well be that using traditional fuel wood in an ineffi-
cient stove is the cheapest way to produce the required heat. However, 
factoring in alternative uses of the time spent for wood collection – for 
example, for other productive uses or just leisure activities – turns wood 
collection into an inconvenient task. A more efficient stove using com-
mercial fuels reduces pollution and time spent gathering fuel wood, 
and hence reduces  inconvenience costs. Likewise, the capital spent on a 
more efficient stove may not be available for other investments – say, a 
pump for irrigation – and thus represents an  opportunity cost. 
 1.10  Roadmap to the Chapters of the GEA 
 Earlier transitions of the world’s energy system, from biomass to coal, 
to oil, and now to a mix of coal, oil, and natural gas as the dominat-
ing energy carriers were all driven by convenience and cost reductions. 
Coming energy transitions will occur in a world that has changed through 
the “great acceleration” ( Chapter 3 ) that started in the 1950s and is still 
ongoing. The next transitions will have to consider these changes that in 
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fact create demands on the performance of the coming energy systems 
in order for the world to develop in a sustainable manner. 
 The 25 chapters of the GEA are divided into four clusters. 
 Cluster I sets out to describe and assess the nature and magnitude of 
energy system changes required from a key set of conditions and 
concerns.  Chapter 2 evaluates the role of energy in poverty allevi-
ation and socio-economic growth and what will be required from the 
energy systems to make poverty a condition of the past, especially in 
terms of access to electricity and clean cooking fuels and practices. 
 Chapter 3 reviews the environmental impacts of energy systems and 
what changes would be required, especially in terms of emissions 
reductions, to protect the environment as it is now known, including 
mitigating climate change.  Chapter 4 addresses the health impacts 
of energy systems, especially indoor and outdoor air pollution, and 
health impacts of climate change.  Chapter 5 analyzes energy secur-
ity from several points of view, and  Chapter 6 reviews the demands 
for energy services from a growing global population with increased 
standards of living, especially for the poorer parts of the world. 
Together, indicators defined and quantified for the purpose of the 
GEA in these five areas are used to define a “sustainable” state of 
the world from an energy systems perspective by 2050. 
 Cluster II reviews the resources and energy technologies available, 
or on the horizon, to address the energy sustainability challenges. 
 Chapter 7 evaluates reserves and resources of fossil fuels, fissile 
material, and renewable energy flows.  Chapters 8 through  10 deal 
with energy end-use in industry, transport, and buildings, respect-
ively, and Chapters  11 through  16 review energy supply-side options, 
including renewable energy technologies, fossil fuel technologies, 
carbon capture and storage, nuclear energy, energy systems oper-
ation, and transitions to new energy systems. 
 Cluster III then explores how the elements of Cluster II can be combined 
into  systems that address all the concerns identified in Cluster I, all 
at the same time.  Chapter 17 presents this back-casting (normative 
scenario) analysis and identifies a number of conceivable energy sys-
tems that would meet the goals from Cluster I. Special attention is 
then given to urbanization ( Chapter 18 ), energy access for develop-
ment ( Chapter 19 ), trade-offs in land and water use ( Chapter 20 ) and 
life-styles ( Chapter 21 ). 
 Cluster IV deals with policies and institutions to bring about the sus-
tainable energy systems that were identified in Cluster III.  Chapter 
22 reviews the overall implementation situation,  Chapter 23 the 
implementation of options for access to modern energy carriers 
and clean cooking fuels,  Chapter 24 technology innovation sys-
tems, and  Chapter 25 the capacity development required in terms 
of policies, institutions, and people that will be the agents of 
change to make the next energy transition toward sustainability 
happen. 
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 Appendix 1.A Accounting for Energy 
 1.A.1 Introduction 
 The discussion of energy systems above described how primary energy 
occurs in different forms embodied in resources as they exist in nature, 
such as chemical energy embodied in fossils or biomass, the potential 
kinetic energy of water drawn from a reservoir, the electromagnetic 
energy of solar radiation, or the energy released in nuclear reactions. A 
logical question is, therefore, how to compare and assess the potential 
substitutability of these energy “apples and oranges.” This is the object-
ive of this more technical section. 
 The primary energy of fossil energy sources and biomass is defined in 
terms of the heating value (enthalpy 45 ) of combustion. Together, com-
bustibles account for about 90% of current primary energy in the world, 
corresponding to some 440 EJ in 2005. There are two different defini-
tions of the heat of combustion, the  higher (HHV) and  lower heating 
values (LHV – see the discussion below), but otherwise the determin-
ation of apple-to-apple primary energy comparisons among combust-
ible energy sources is relatively straightforward. 
 The situation is more complicated for non-combustible primary energy 
sources such as nuclear energy and renewables other than biomass. 
In these cases, primary energy is not used directly but is converted 
and transformed into  secondary energy (energy carriers) such as elec-
tricity as in the case of modern wind or photovoltaic power plants. The 
measurable energy flow is the secondary energy, whereas the primary 
energy input needed to generate electricity needs to be estimated. In 
the two examples of wind and solar photovoltaics, primary energy esti-
mates of the kinetic energy of wind and the electromagnetic energy of 
solar radiation are needed to determine primary energy equivalences 
to other energy sources. There are various conventions that specify the 
appropriate conversion from different renewable energy forms based 
on the generated electricity. For these conventions, the type of energy 
flow and its technological characteristics – such as the efficiency of 
the wind converters or photovoltaic cells – are needed. These various 
important accounting issues are dealt with below, starting with units 
and heating values. 
 1.A.2 Energy Units, Scale, and Heating Values 
(HHV/LHV) 
 Energy is defined as the capacity to do work and is measured in joules (J), 
where 1 joule is the work done when a force of 1 Newton (1 N=1 kg m/s 2 ) 
is applied over a distance of 1 meter. Power is the rate at which energy 
is transferred and is commonly measured in watts (W), where 1 watt is 
1 joule/second. Newton, joule, and watt are defined as basic units in the 
International System of Units (SI). 46 
 There is a wide variety of energy units which can be converted into 
each other.  Figure 1.3 in  Section 1.2.1 above, gives an overview of the 
most commonly used energy units and also indicates typical (rounded) 
conversion factors (see also  Appendix 1.B ). Typically, the choice of an 
energy unit depends on various factors such as the type of the energy 
carrier itself, the respective energy sector, as well as geographical and 
historical contexts. Next to the internationally standardized SI units, 
the most common energy unit used for electricity is the kilowatt-hour 
(kWh), which is derived from the joule (one kWh (1000 Watt-hours) 
being equivalent to 3600 kilo-Watt-seconds, or 3.6 MJ). In many inter-
national energy statistics (e.g., IEA and OECD) tonnes of oil equivalent 
(1  toe equals 41.87 x 10 9 J) is used as a core energy unit, but it is not 
included in the SI system. Certain energy subsectors often use units that 
apply best to their respective energy carrier. For example, the oil industry 
uses barrels of oil equivalent (1  boe equals 5.71 x 10 9 J or about 1/7 of 
a  toe ), the coal industry tonnes of coal equivalent (1  tce equals 29.31 x 
10 9 J), whereas the gas industry uses cubic meters of gas at a normal-
ized pressure (1 m 3 of methane equals 34 MJ – all numbers refer to LHV; 
see the discussion below). Some countries such as the US use the impe-
rial system of units, which include British Thermal Units (1 BTU equals 
1055 J) as a unit for energy, cubic feet (for natural gas, one ft 3 equals 
about 1000 BTU, or 1 MJ), and barrels as volumetric energy units (bbl is 
another name for  boe ). 
 The  calorific value or  heating value of a fuel expresses the heat obtained 
from combustion of one unit of the fuel. It is important to distinguish 
between the higher heating value (HHV or gross calorific value) and the 
lower heating value (LHV or net calorific value). Most combustible fuels 
consist of hydrocarbon compounds that are primarily mixtures of car-
bon and hydrogen. When the hydrogen combines with oxygen, it forms 
water in a gaseous state, which is typically carried away with the other 
products of combustion in the exhaust gases. Similarly, any moisture 
present in the fuel will typically also evaporate. When the exhaust gases 
cool, this water will condense into a liquid state and release heat, known 
as  latent heat, which can be captured and utilized for low-temperature 
heating purposes. 
 The  HHV of a fuel includes the latent heat recovered from condensing 
water vapor from combustion. Modern condensing natural gas or oil 
boilers can capture this latent heat. 47 The  LHV excludes the latent heat 
of the water formed during combustion. 
 45  Enthalpy – from the Greek “to warm/heat” – is the product of the mass of a fuel 
times its speciﬁ c enthalpy, which is deﬁ ned as the sum of its internal energy (from 
combustion) plus pressure times volume. Heating values per unit mass of a fuel are, 
therefore, deﬁ ned for standardized pressure/volume conditions. 
 46  International System of Units –  SI from the French  le Système international 
d’unités. 
 47  Commercial advertisements often inappropriately refer to furnaces as “more than 
100% efﬁ cient,” which is thermodynamically impossible. The seeming paradox sim-
ply results from comparing apples and oranges in the form of LHV fuel energy inputs 
but HHV combustion energy releases. 
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 The differences between LHV and HHV are typically about 5–6% of 
the HHV for solid and liquid fuels, and about 10% for natural gas (IEA, 
 2005 ). Typically, the LHV is used in energy balances, since most current 
energy conversion devices are still not able to recover latent heat. The 
distinction between HHV and LHV becomes important when comparing 
international energy statistics and balances (usually based on LHV, as in 
IEA or UN statistics) with national ones that can sometimes be based 
on HHV (as in case of the US Energy Information Administration, EIA). 
Care is also required when applying fuel-specific emission factors – for 
example, for CO 2 – that are specified separately per HHV or LHV to the 
corresponding heating value of the fuel as defined in the underlying 
energy statistics but not always spelled out prominently. As a precau-
tionary measure to avoid accounting errors, literature sources on emis-
sion factors and energy use numbers that do not specify their underlying 
heating value concept definition should be avoided. In this publication 
both definitions are used, but the LHV is the default, as in most inter-
national energy statistics (e.g., UN or IEA). 
 1.A.3 Accounting for Primary Energy 
 As discussed above, the determination of the primary energy equivalent 
of combustible fuels (all fossils as well as biomass) is straightforward 
(only a consistent HHV or LHV reporting format needs to be adopted). 
For non-combustible energies (modern renewables such as wind or solar 
photovoltaics, geothermal, hydropower, and nuclear), there are different 
conventions that specify the appropriate conversion factors to account 
for primary energy equivalents: the  substitution, the  direct equivalent , 
and the  physical energy content method (which is a hybrid combination 
of the substitution and direct equivalent methods). The share of non-
combustible energy sources in total primary energy supply will appear 
to be very different depending on the method used (Lightfoot,  2007 ; 
Macknick,  2009 ): 
 The (partial)  substitution method estimates the primary energy from 
non-combustible sources as being equivalent to the LHV or HHV of 
combustible fuels that would have been required in conventional 
thermal power plants to substitute the generated electricity or some 
other secondary energy form. Basically, this means that some aver-
age or representative efficiency of thermal power plants is applied to 
calculate the equivalent primary energy from the generated electricity 
from nuclear and renewables outside biomass. 48 This method is used, 
for example, by BP ( 2010a ) and WEC ( 1993 ) and as the default method 
in the GEA (see Annex-II Technical Guidelines) to maintain a consistent 
accounting framework across different energy options. 49 Throughout 
the GEA there is always a clear indication if another method is used. 
The difficulties with this method include choosing an appropriate ther-
mal power generating efficiency factor and the fact that the method 
displays “hypothetical” transformation losses in energy balances 
which end up as reported primary energy use, but which do not have 
any physical basis. 
 The (direct)  equivalent method counts one unit of secondary energy 
such as generated electricity from non-combustible sources as one unit 
of primary energy. This method is also often used in the literature – for 
example, by UN Statistics (2010) and in multiple IPCC reports that deal 
with long-term energy and emission scenarios (Watson et al.,  1995 ; 
Nakicenovic and Swart,  2000 ; Morita et al.,  2001 ; Fisher et al.,  2007 ). 
The difficulties with this method are twofold: (i) an increase in the share 
of non-combustible energy sources results in the apparent efficiency 
improvement of the whole energy system because ever higher shares of 
primary energy have a definitional 100% “efficiency” of conversion into 
secondary forms, and (ii) actual conversion efficiencies even for these 
non-combustible sources of primary energy are substantially lower than 
100% – for instance, the theoretical maximum efficiency (under optimal 
conditions) of converting wind kinetic energy into electricity is about 
59%, but actual machines today achieve at best 47%. 
 The (physical)  energy content method adopts a hybrid approach, using 
the direct equivalent approach for all energy sources other than those 
where primary energy is heat, such as nuclear, solar thermal, and geo-
thermal energy sources. Thermal energy generated in a nuclear, geo-
thermal, or solar power plant is considered primary energy equivalent. 
For example, in the case of nuclear energy, the heat released by fission 
is taken as primary energy, even though two-thirds are dissipated 50 to 
the environment through the turbine’s condenser and the reactor cool-
ing system and only one-third is actually delivered as electricity. This 
approach is identical to the case of fossil energy, for which the heat 
of combustion is taken as primary energy. In effect, the hybrid system 
leads to the following assumed primary energy accounting: (i)  substitu-
tion method for heat from nuclear, geothermal, and solar thermal, and 
(ii)  direct equivalent method for electricity from hydropower, wind, tide, 
wave, and solar photovoltaic energy. This hybrid method is used by the 
OECD, the International Energy Agency and Eurostat (IEA,  2005 ). The dif-
ficulty with this method is that it can result in confusion, as some energy 
forms such as hydropower are accounted for by the direct equivalent 
method, while for others such as nuclear conversion efficiencies are 
applied. Even though they both generate about the same electricity in 
the world, nuclear’s primary energy equivalent is counted as three times 
larger than that of hydropower. 51 
 48  Note, however, that different variants of the substitution method use somewhat 
different conversion factors. For example, BP applies 38% conversion efﬁ ciency to 
electricity generated from nuclear and hydro (BP, 2010), whereas the World Energy 
Council uses 38.6% for nuclear and non-combustible renewables. 
 49  In the GEA a uniform primary accounting equivalent of 35% conversion efﬁ ciency for 
electricity from non-combustible sources (equivalent to the global average of fossil-
fuel power generation in 2005) and of 85% conversion efﬁ ciency for heat is applied. 
 50  In principle such waste heat could be “recycled” but would require a close co-loca-
tion of nuclear power plants with main energy uses such as major cities, which raises 
issues of safety and public risk perception. 
 51  For example, in IEA/OECD (2005) the assumed conversion efﬁ ciency factor for hydro-
power, solar electricity, and wind is 100%, for nuclear power it is 33%, and for 
geothermal electricity it is 10%. 
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concept of a statistically defined primary energy that has no real physical 
equivalence is thus becoming more limited as more radical future energy 
systems depart from current ones. 
 Figure 1.A.1 illustrates this growing divergence across the three primary 
energy accounting methods for an otherwise identical scenario in terms 
of final and useful energy demand (based on the intermediary GEA-M 
set of pathways; see  Chapter 17 ). As the structure of the global energy 
system changes, different accounting methods differ by more than a fac-
tor of two in terms of implied primary energy growth. No such signifi-
cant accounting ambiguities affect secondary and final energy, which are 
thus preferable descriptors for radical, transformative changes in energy 
systems. 
 1.A.5 Main Energy Statistics and Data Sources 
 Four institutions regularly publish globally comprehensive statis-
tics on energy use: British Petroleum (BP), the US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), the International Energy Agency (IEA), and the United 
Nations (UN). As  Table 1.A.2 shows, these energy statistics differ in terms 
of energy coverage ranging from primary energy (PE), primary and second-
ary energy (EIA, IEA, UN), to primary, secondary, and final energy (IEA). 
 Data are mainly collected through questionnaires and exchanges 
between the organizations as well as with others, including but not 
limited to publications from the Statistical Office of the European 
Communities (Eurostat), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the 
Organización Latinoamericana de Energía (OLADE), etc. 
 Statistics differ in the extent to which they include non-commercial 
energy (use of traditional biomass), which is fully covered in the IEA 
statistics (all sources) and partially in UN (mainly fuel wood), as well 
as modern renewables (outside hydropower), with only IEA and UN 
 Table 1.A.1 |  Comparison of global primary energy supply in 2005 using three 
different accounting methods for primary energy.  
GEA Substitution 
Method
Direct Equivalent 
Method
Physical Energy 
Content Method
EJ % EJ % EJ %
Fossil fuels 389 78 389 85 389 81
Biomass 46 9 46 10 46 10
Nuclear 28 6 10 2 30 6
Hydro 30 6 11 2 11 2
Other 
Renewables
< 3 1 1 <1 3 1
Total 496 100 457 100 479 100
Source: data from IEA,  2010 .
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 Figure 1.A.1. |  Comparison of global total primary energy supply between 2005 and 
2100 using three different primary energy accounting methods based on identical 
useful energy demands as quantiﬁ ed in the illustrative GEA-M set of pathways (see 
 Chapter 17 ). 
 A detailed overview of differences in primary energy accounting from 
different energy statistics is described in Macknick ( 2009 ); see also 
 Figure 1.A.2 below (the paper also contains a link to a data base where 
users can specify their own standardized accounting convention applied 
to the main international energy statistical data sources). 
 Table 1.A.1 compares the differences across the primary energy account-
ing methods for the world by energy source using the GEA primary 
substitution equivalent (see Technical Guidelines, Annex-II), the direct 
equivalent, and the physical energy content methods for the year 2005 
based on IEA data (IEA,  2010 ). As is to be expected, the main differ-
ences in absolute terms across the methods are for nuclear, hydropower, 
and other renewables (except biomass). Great care is, therefore, advised 
when using and comparing reported primary energy across different 
statistical sources in general and in comparing the numbers reported in 
the GEA in particular. 
 1.A.4 Limitations of Primary Energy Accounting 
 The alternative primary energy accounting methods outlined above 
show significant differences in how non-combustible energy sources 
are presented in energy statistics. As the differences are significant for 
nuclear and renewables, the accounting method chosen has an impact 
on how the primary energy structure is interpreted. This in itself is an 
important limitation of the concept of primary energy. It is also a cause 
of considerable confusion in comparing different statistics, data sources, 
and analyses (and the ensuing emphasis on the importance of different 
energy options). 
 The differences of applying the three accounting methods to current 
energy use levels are relatively modest compared to those in scenarios 
of possible future major energy transformations where the structure of 
the global energy system changes significantly (see  Chapter 17 ). The 
accounting gap between the different methods tends to become bigger 
over time as the share of combustible energy sources declines. The very 
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statistics cover the period since 1965, are updated regularly, 54 and are 
available free of charge on the Internet. Cumulative installed renewable 
power capacity data are provided in BP’s full workbook of historical stat-
istical data from 1965–2009 (BP,  2010b ). US EIA energy statistics, which 
are also freely available online, cover primary and secondary energy use 
by fuel category and per country since 1980, using the (non-SI) BTU as a 
common energy metric and based on HHV, which is different than other 
energy statistics. 
 As a result of differences in data collection sources, boundary condi-
tions, methodologies, and heating values used in different statistics, 
global primary energy use numbers reported by these four organiza-
tions differ from 442 EJ (BP) to 487 EJ (EIA), or by some 10%, for the 
GEA base year 2005 and throughout their entire reporting horizon 
(see  Figure 1.A.2 ). Adjusting 55 the different primary accounting con-
ventions to the GEA standard and completing non-reported energies 
(non-commercial, traditional biomass using the IEA numbers) reduces 
this data uncertainty to a range from 495 EJ (IEA and BP) to 528 EJ 
(EIA 56 ), or some 7%, with the UN statistics taking an intermediary 
position (506 EJ) for the GEA base year 2005 (see  Figure 1.A.2 ). This 
assessment adopts a value of 495 EJ for the level of world primary 
energy use in the year 2005. 
200
300
400
500
600
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
EJ
IEA original
BP original
UN original
EIA original
IEA harmonized
BP harmonized
UN harmonized
EIA harmonized
 Figure 1.A.2. |  World primary energy. Original data by four reporting agencies and 
harmonized primary energy equivalences. Source: data from Macknick,  2009 . 
providing (near) full coverage (with BP reporting selected modern 
renewables). Different reporting organizations also use different 
methods for expressing the primary energy equivalent of non-com-
bustible energies (see Section 1.11.3 on Primary Energy Accounting 
above) and in their use of heating values (see the discussion above). 
LHV are used by the UN and IEA (and unless otherwise specified in 
this report). HHV are used in US EIA statistics (which therefore tend 
to report systematically higher energy use compared to other data 
sources), with BP using a hybrid approach which is closer to UN/IEA 
statistical values). 
 Both the UN and IEA provide comprehensive energy statistics on the pro-
duction, trade, conversion, and use of primary and secondary, conven-
tional and non-conventional, and new and renewable sources of energy 
covering the period from 1970 onwards (UN,  2010 ; IEA,  2010 ). 52 IEA’s 
energy balances represent convenient aggregates of all energy flows in 
a common (non-SI) energy metric in tonnes of oil equivalent, summa-
rized from IEA’s energy statistics and for global and regional aggregates 
as well as for individual countries. The IEA statistics cover approximately 
130 countries (of 192 UN Member countries), which represent about 
98% of worldwide energy use (IPCC,  2006 ). BP statistics focus on com-
mercial and conventional energy carriers and exclude fuels such as 
wood, peat, and animal waste and energy flows of other renewables 
such as wind, geothermal, and solar power generation 53 (BP,  2010a ). Its 
 Table 1.A.2 |  Overview of the four major data sources for Global Energy Statistics. 
BP EIA IEA UN
Primary energy  X  X  X  X 
Secondary energy  X  X  X 
Final energy  X  −  1  
New renewables 2  X  X  X 
Traditional biomass 3  X  X 
Electronic availability Online free Online free Online 
subscription ($)
Ofﬂ ine tape 
order ($)
 1  Not reported directly by UN but can be calculated from full data base statistics. 
 2  New renewable refers to solar, wind, modern bioenergy, and geothermal. 
 3  Traditional biomass refers to fuel wood, dung, and agricultural residues. 
 52  Electronic data need to be purchased from the UN and processed with appropri-
ate data base software tools as few aggregates are contained in the statistics. For 
instance ﬁ nal energy use is not reported directly by the UN, but can be calculated 
from a multitude of individual energy ﬂ ows reported. The UN data portal allows free 
electronic access to statistics of individual energy ﬂ ows as well as few aggregate 
energy indicators (primary energy use, electricity generation) from 1990 onwards. 
Full IEA energy balances, by energy ﬂ ow, use, and sector since 1971 are available 
online to subscribers (including many universities) of the OECD iLibrary online pub-
lication and statistical query service: The statistics of the EIA and BP are available 
online free of charge but provide a somewhat more limited coverage as well as 
adopt differing accounting conventions to UN and IEA. 
 53  With exception of ethanol, only installed capacity data for geothermal, wind, and 
solar are reported by BP. 
 54  Updates are fastest among all energy statistics and available by September each 
year for the preceding year. 
 55  A software tool performing data comparison and adjustments to consistent 
and comparable accounting conventions for the 20 largest energy-using coun-
tries worldwide as well as the global total has been developed by Macknick 
( 2009 ) and is available online: www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/TNT/WEB/Publications/
Energy_Carbon_DataBase/. 
 56  Due to the use of HHV in the EIA statistics. 
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 Appendix 1.B Conversion Tables and GEA Regional Definitions 
 
 
 Table 1.B.1 |  Conversion factors.  
FROM
TO->
MJ TCE btu toe boe kWyr kcal TJ Gcal Mtoe Mbtu GWh GWyr
 MJ 1 3.4121E-05 947.8134 2.39E-05 0.000175 3.171E-05 238.8459 0.000001 0.00023885 2.3885E-11 0.00094781 2.7778E-07 3.171E-11
 TCE 29307.6 1 27778140 0.7 5.131 0.9293379 7000000 0.0293076 7 0.0000007 27.77814 0.008141 9.2934E-07
 btu 0.00105506 3.6E-08 1 2.52E-08 1.85E-07 3.346E-08 0.2519968 1.0551E-09 2.52E-07 2.52E-14 0.000001 2.9307E-10 3.3456E-14
 toe 41868 1.428571 39683050 1 7.33 1.327626 10000000 0.041868 10 0.000001 39.68305 0.01163 1.3276E-06
 boe 5711.869031 0.19489378 5413784.9 0.136426 1 0.1811222 1364256 0.00571187 1.364256 1.3643E-07 5.413786 0.00158663 1.8112E-07
 kWyr 31536 1.07603488 29890240 0.753224 5.521135 1 7532244 0.031536 7.532244 7.5322E-07 29.89024 0.00876 0.000001
 kcal 0.0041868 1.4286E-07 3.968305 1E-07 7.33E-07 1.328E-07 1 4.1868E-09 0.000001 1E-13 3.9683E-06 1.163E-09 1.3276E-13
 TJ 1000000 34.12084 947813400 23.88459 175.074 31.70979 238845900 1 238.8459 2.3885E-05 947.8134 0.27777778 3.171E-05
 Gcal 4186.8 0.14285714 3968305 0.1 0.733 0.1327626 1000000 0.0041868 1 0.0000001 3.968305 0.001163 1.3276E-07
 Mtoe 41868000000 1428571 3.968E+13 1000000 7330000 1327626 1E+13 41868 10000000 1 39683050 11630.0004 1.327626
 Mbtu 1055.06 0.03599953 1000000 0.0252 0.184714 0.0334557 251996.8 0.00105506 0.2519968 2.52E-08 1 0.00029307 3.3456E-08
 GWh 3600000 122.835 3.412E+09 85.98452 630.2666 114.1553 859845200 3.6 859.8452 8.5985E-05 3412.128 1 0.00011416
 GWyr 31536000000 1076034.88 2.989E+13 753224.4 5521135 1000000 7.5374E+12 31536 7532244 0.7532244 29910720 8759.99625 1
Source: Nakicenovic et al.,  1998 .
 Table 1.B.2a |  Typical caloriﬁ c values of solid energy carriers.  
 Gross calorific 
value 
 HHV [MJ/kg] 
 Net calorific value 
 LHV [MJ/kg] 
Anthracite 29.65–30.35 28.95–30.35
Cooking coals 27.80–30.80 26.60–29.80
Other bituminous 23.85–26.75 22.60–25.50
Metallurgical coke 27.90 27.45
Gas coke 28.35 27.9
Low-temperature coke 26.30 25.4
Petroleum coke 30.5–35.8 30.0–35.3
Wood 15–19 -
 Note: Detailed information on energy and chemical characteristics for a wide range of 
biomass fuels can be found at IEA Task 32 biomass database: http://www.ieabcc.nl; 
 Phyllis biomass database: http://www.ecn.nl/phyllis; 
 TU Vienna biomass database: http://www.vt.tuwien.ac.at/biobib. 
Source: IEA/OECD/Eurostat, 2005. 
 Table 1.B.2b |  Typical caloriﬁ c values of liquid energy carriers.  
 Gross calorific value 
 HHV [GJ/tonne] 
 Net calorific value 
 LHV [GJ/tonne] 
Ethane 51.90 47.51
Propane 50.32 46.33
Butane 49.51 45.72
LPG 50.08 46.15
Naphtha 47.73 45.34
Aviation gasoline 47.40 45.03
Motor gasoline 41.10 44.75
Aviation turbine fuel 46.23 43.92
Other kerosene 46.23 43.92
Gas/diesel oil 45.66 43.38
Fuel oil, low sulphur 44.40 42.18
Fuel oil, high sulphur 43.76 41.57
Biodiesel – 36.8–40.9
Biogasoline – 24.0–37.4
Ethanol 29.4 26.87
Methanol 22.36 19.99
Dimethyl ether 30.75 28.62
Source: IEA/OECD/Eurostat,  2005 ; Agarwal, 2007; IEA, 2009b.
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 Table 1.B.2c |  Typical caloriﬁ c values of gaseous energy carriers per kg and m 3 .  
 Gross 
calorific 
value 
 HHV [MJ/
kg] 
 Net calorific 
value 
 LHV [MJ/kg] 
 Gross 
calorific 
value 
 HHV 
[MJ/m 3 ] 
 Net 
calorific 
value 
 LHV [MJ/
m 3 ] 
Methane 55.52 50.03 37.652 33.939
Natural gas 
(Norway)
− − 39.668 −
Natural gas 
(Netherlands)
− − 33.339 −
Natural gas (Russia) − − 37.578 −
Natural gas 
(Algeria)
− − 42.000 −
Natural gas (United 
States)
− − 38.341 −
Source: IEA/OECD/Eurostat, 2005 ; IEA, 2009a.
 Table 1.B.3 |  CO 2 emission factors on a net caloriﬁ c basis.  
Fuel type
 IPCC default 
 [kg/GJ] 
 Range from 
 [kg/GJ] 
 to 
 [kg/GJ] 
Crude Oil 73.3 71.1 75.5
Motor Gasoline 69.3 67.5 73.0
Jet Gasoline 70.0 67.5 73.0
Jet Kerosene 71.5 69.7 74.4
Kerosene 71.9 70.8 73.7
Gas / Diesel Oil 74.1 72.6 74.8
Residual Fuel Oil 77.4 75.5 78.8
Liqueﬁ ed Petroleum Gases 63.1 61.6 65.6
Ethane 61.6 56.5 68.6
Naphtha 73.3 69.3 76.3
Petroleum Coke 97.5 82.9 115.0
Anthracite 98.3 94.6 101.0
Coking Coal 94.6 87.3 101.0
Lignite 101.0 90.9 115.0
Oil Shale and Tar Sands 107.0 90.2 125.0
Brown Coal Briquettes 97.5 87.3 109.0
Natural Gas 56.1 54.3 58.3
Compressed Natural Gas 56.1 54.3 58.3
Liqueﬁ ed Natural Gas 56.1 54.3 58.3
Municipal Wastes (non-
biomass fraction)
91.7 73.3 121.0
Municipal Wastes (biomass 
fraction)
100.0 84.7 117.0
Industrial Wastes 143.0 110.0 183.0
Waste Oils 73.3 72.2 74.4
Peat 106.0 100.0 108.0
Wood / Wood Waste 112.0 95.0 132.0
Sulphite lyes (Black Liquor) 95.3 80.7 110.0
Other Primary Solid Biomass 100.0 84.7 117.0
Charcoal 112.0 95.0 132.0
Biogasoline 70.8 59.8 84.3
Biodiesels 70.8 59.8 84.3
Other liquid biofuels 79.6 67.1 95.3
Landﬁ ll Gas 54.6 46.2 66.0
Sludge Gas 54.6 46.2 66.0
Other Biogas 54.6 46.2 66.0
 Note: Values represent CO 2 emissions that arise with 100 percent oxidation of fuel 
carbon content at the point of combustion. Life-cycle CO 2 emissions for various fuels 
can be higher or lower, due to emissions in the supply chain of the fuel and due to car-
bon absorbed during the growth phase of biomass feedstock. 
Source: IPCC,  2006 . 
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OECD90
LAC
OECD90
REF
ASIA
MAF
LAC
MAF
REF
ASIA
Regional acronyms Regional definition
OECD90
REF
ASIA
MAF
LAC
UNFCC Annex I countries
Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union
Asia excl. OECD90 countries
Middle East and Africa
Latin America and the Caribbean
OECD90 = OECD countries as of 1990 in Western Europe, North America, and Pacific Asia (and defined in UNFCCC as Annex-I countries)
REF = Countries undergoing economic reform, i.e. countries  in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
ASIA = non-Annex-I countries in Asia
MAF = Middle East and  North, and Sub-Saharan Africa
LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean
For country listings and finer-resolution regional definitions see  Annex-II.
 Figure 1.B.1. |  Deﬁ nition of GEA regions, see also Annex-II Technical guidelines . 
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